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Abstract 
We examine the ability of the government to impact mortgage refinancing activity and spur consumption 
by focusing on the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (HARP). The policy allowed intermediaries to 
refinance insufficiently collateralized mortgages by extending government credit guarantee on such loans. 
We use proprietary loan-level panel data from a large market participant with refinancing history and 
social security number matched consumer credit records of each borrower. A difference-in-difference 
empirical design based on eligibility requirements of the program reveals a substantial increase in 
refinancing activity by the program: more than three million eligible borrowers with primarily fixed-rate 
mortgages – the predominant contract type in the U.S. -- refinanced their loans under HARP. Borrowers 
received a reduction of around 140 basis points in interest rate, on average, due to HARP refinancing, 
amounting to about $3,500 in annual savings per borrower. There was a significant increase in the durable 
spending by borrowers after refinancing, with larger increase among more indebted borrowers. Regions 
more exposed to the program saw a relative increase in non-durable and durable consumer spending, a 
decline in foreclosure rates, and faster recovery in house prices. A variety of identification strategies 
reveal that competitive frictions in the refinancing market may have partly hampered the program’s 
impact. On average, these frictions reduced take-up rate among eligible borrowers by 10%-20% and cut 
interest rate savings by 16-33 basis points, with larger effects among the most indebted borrowers who 
were the key target of the program. These findings have implications for future policy interventions, pass-
through of monetary policy through household balance sheets, and design of the mortgage market.  
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I. Introduction 
Mortgage refinancing is one of the main channels through which households can benefit from 
decline in the cost of credit. Indeed, because fixed rate mortgage debt is the dominant form of 
financial obligation of households in the U.S and many other economies, refinancing constitutes 
one of the main direct channels for transmission of simulative effects of accommodative 
monetary policy (Campbell and Cocco 2003, Scharfstein and Sunderam 2014, Keys, Pope, and 
Pope 2014). Consequently, in times of adverse economic conditions, central banks commonly 
lower interest rates in order to encourage mortgage refinancing, lower foreclosures, and stimulate 
household consumption. However, the ability of such actions to influence household 
consumption through refinancing depends on the ability of households to access refinancing 
markets and on the extent to which lenders compete and pass-through lower rates to consumers.  
While there is no work that that has systematically analyzed these issues, the importance of the 
first factor became apparent in aftermath of the recent financial crisis when many mortgage 
borrowers lost the ability to refinance their existing loans (Hubbard and Mayer 2009).1 Faced 
with a situation in which close to half of all borrowers in the economy were severely limited 
from accessing mortgage markets, the federal government launched a large-scale refinancing 
initiative called the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (HARP). In a nutshell, HARP 
allowed eligible borrowers with insufficient equity to refinance their mortgages by extending 
explicit federal credit guarantee to lenders. This paper uses HARP as a laboratory to examine the 
government’s ability to impact refinancing activity and spur household consumption. 
Our paper has two objectives. First, we want to quantify the impact of HARP on mortgage 
refinancing activity and analyze consumer spending and other economic outcomes among 
borrowers and regions exposed to the program. In doing so, we hope to assess consumer 
behavior around refinancing among borrowers with Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRMs), the 
predominant contract type in the U.S. Second, after demonstrating that a substantial number of 
eligible borrowers did not benefit from the program, we will analyze the importance of 
competitive frictions in the refinancing market in hampering HARP’s reach. This sets us apart 
from prior work that has focused on borrower specific factors, like inattention, in explaining their 
sluggish response to refinancing incentives (Andersen, Campbell, Nielsen, and Ramadorai 2014).  
We use a proprietary dataset from a large secondary market participant to execute our analysis. 
The dataset covers more than 50% of conforming mortgages (more than 20 million) issued with 
guarantees of the Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs). This loan-level panel data has detailed 
information on loan, property, and borrower characteristics and monthly payment history. 
Importantly, this data contains unique identifiers (Social Security Numbers) for each borrower 
																																																								
1 CoreLogic estimates that in early 2010, close to a quarter of all mortgage borrowers owed more than their houses 
were worth and another quarter had less than 20% equity, a common threshold for credit without external support. 
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allowing us to construct their refinancing history, determine the present and prior mortgage 
terms during the refinancing process including fees charged by GSEs for insuring credit default 
risk (g-fee), the servicer responsible for their prior and current mortgage, as well as accurately 
capture various forms of consumer debt using their linked credit bureau records.  
We start our analysis by assessing the impact of the program on the mortgage refinancing rate. 
To get an estimate of the counterfactual level in the absence of the program, we exploit variation 
in exposure of similar borrowers to the program. Specifically, we use high loan-to-value (LTV) 
loans sold to GSEs (the so-called conforming loans) as the treatment group since these loans 
were eligible for the program. Loans with observationally similar characteristics, but issued 
without government guarantees (non-agency loans), serve as a control group since these 
mortgages were ineligible for the program. Using difference-in-differences specifications we 
find a large differential change in the refinancing rate of eligible loans relative to the control 
group after the program implementation date. Thus, by addressing the problem of limited access 
to refinancing due to insufficient equity, HARP led to substantial number of refinances (more 
than 3 million). We also quantify the extent of savings received by borrowers on HARP 
refinances and find around 140 basis points of interest rate savings were passed through on the 
intensive margin. This amounts to about $3,500 in annual savings per borrower -- a 20% 
reduction in monthly mortgage payments.   
We also analyze the consumer spending patterns among borrowers who refinanced under the 
program. Our analysis based on new auto financing patterns suggests that borrowers significantly 
increased their durable (auto) spending (by about $1,600 over two years) after the refinancing 
date, about 20% of their interest rate savings. This increase in spending is substantially larger 
among more indebted and less creditworthy borrowers. We augment this analysis by assessing 
how outcome variables, accurately measured at the zip code level -- such as non-durable and 
durable consumer spending, foreclosures, and house prices—changed in regions based on their 
exposure to the program. The advantage of this data is that it allows us to measure household 
consumption directly, including credit card spending, as well as analyze the broader effects of 
the program (e.g. on house prices). We find that regions more exposed to the program 
experienced a meaningful increase in durable and non-durable consumer spending (auto and 
credit card purchases), relative decline in foreclosure rate, and faster recovery in house prices. 
Although the first part of the paper illustrates that the program had considerable impact on 
refinancing activity, it also shows that a significant number of eligible borrowers did not take 
advantage of the program. In the second part of our analysis, we investigate the role of 
intermediary competition in impacting HARP’s reach and effectiveness.  
There are at least a couple of reasons why competitive frictions could play an important role in 
the program implementation. First, to the extent that an existing relationship might confer some 
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competitive advantage to the incumbent servicer -- whether through lower (re-) origination costs, 
less costly solicitation, or better information regarding borrower conditions -- such advantages 
could be enhanced under the program since it targeted more indebted borrowers. Second, in an 
effort to encourage servicer participation, the program rules imposed a lesser legal burden on 
existing (incumbent) servicers.  
To shed light on the importance of such factors, we start by comparing the interest rates on 
HARP refinances to the interest rates on regular conforming refinances originated during the 
same period (HARP-conforming refi spread). The latter group serves as a natural counterfactual, 
as the funding market for such loans – extended to creditworthy borrowers with significant 
housing equity -- was quite competitive and remained fairly unobstructed throughout the crisis 
period. Thus, the spread captures the extent of pass-through of lower interest rates to borrowers 
refinancing under the program relative to those refinancing in the conforming market. 
Importantly, we take advantage of our detailed data on fees charged by GSEs for insuring credit 
risk of loans (g-fees) to precisely account for differences in interest rates due to differential 
creditworthiness of borrowers refinancing in the two markets.   
We find that, on average, a loan refinanced under HARP carries an interest rate that is 16 basis 
points higher relative to conforming mortgages refinanced in the same month. This suggests a 
more limited pass through of interest savings under HARP relative to the regular conforming 
market. The markup is substantial relative to the mean interest rate savings on HARP refinances 
(140 basis points). Notably, this spread persists when we account for a host of observable loan, 
borrower, property and regional characteristics. Moreover, the spread increases substantially 
with the current LTV of the loan, reaching more than 30 basis points for high LTV loans. These 
findings emerge despite the fact that in computing this spread we removed g-fees that account 
for differential mortgage credit risk due to higher LTV ratios. This finding is consistent with the 
idea that higher LTV loans, those with very limited refinancing options outside the program, may 
confer higher advantage to incumbent lender. In addition, we find that loans refinanced under the 
program by larger lenders – ones who are likely to have significant monopoly power in several 
local markets -- carry higher spreads. 
Next, we exploit variation within HARP borrowers that relates the terms of their refinanced 
mortgages to the interest rate on their legacy loans, i.e., rate on the mortgage prior to HARP 
refinancing. The main idea underlying this test is that, in the presence of limited competition, 
incumbent lenders would extract more surplus from borrowers with higher legacy rates since 
such borrowers could be incentivized to refinance at relatively higher rates. Indeed, borrowers 
with higher legacy rates experience substantially smaller rate reductions on HARP refinances 
compared with otherwise observationally similar borrowers with lower legacy rates. These 
results survive when instrumenting the legacy interest rate on a mortgage with the 10-year U.S. 
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Treasury yield prevailing at the time of origination of the legacy mortgage to obtain variation in 
the borrower’s legacy rate that is exogenous to individual and regional characteristics. 
Finally, we take advantage of the change in the program rules introduced in January 2013 that 
relaxed the asymmetric nature of higher legal burden for new lenders refinancing under the 
program relative to incumbent ones. In essence, this change was aimed to alleviate the barriers to 
competition in the HARP refinancing market. We use a difference-in-difference setting around 
the program change to directly assess how changes in competition in the refinancing market 
impacted intensive (mortgage rates) and extensive (refinancing rates) margins. There is a sharp 
and meaningful reduction in the HARP-conforming refi spread (by more than 30%) around the 
program change. Moreover, there was a concurrent increase in the rate at which eligible 
borrowers refinanced under the program (6%) relative to refinancing rate in the conforming 
market. These estimates imply that the refinancing rate among eligible borrowers would be about 
10 to 20 percentage points higher if HARP refinances were priced similar to conforming ones 
(accounting for variation in g-fees). The effects are the largest among the group of the borrowers 
that were the main target of the program – i.e., those with the least amount of home equity. These 
are also the borrowers, who as we show in the first part of the paper, also displayed larger 
increase in spending conditional on program refinancing. Overall, these results suggest that by 
adversely altering refinancing activity, competitive frictions may have significantly reduced the 
program effect on consumption of eligible households, especially those targeted by the program.   
Our paper is closely related to a recent literature that examines the importance of institutional 
frictions and financial intermediaries in effective implementation of stabilization programs, 
particularly in housing markets. In particular, focusing on the Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP), Agarwal et al. (2012) provide evidence that servicer-specific factors related to 
their preexisting organizational capabilities – such as servicing capacity -- can importantly affect 
the effectiveness of policy intervention in debt renegotiation that rely on such intermediaries for 
its implementation.2 In contrast, our work suggests that competition in intermediation market 
may also play a role in effective implementation of some stabilization policies.  
Our paper is also related to the growing literature on the pass-through of monetary policy, 
interest rates, and housing shocks through household balance sheets (e.g., Hurst and Stafford 
(2004), Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013), Keys, Piskorski, Seru, and Yao (2014), Di Maggio, Kermani 
and Ramcharan (2014), Chen, Michaux, Roussanov (2014), Auclert (2015), Agarwal, 
Chomsisengphet, Mahoney, and Strobel (2015) and Beraja et al. (2015)). Within this literature 
																																																								
2 Since HARP requires servicer participation for its implementation, such factors (e.g. servicer capacity constraints) 
could also affect the program reach. Notably, refinancing activity, the target of HARP, is a relatively a routine and 
fairly standardized activity that servicers have significant experience doing. In contrast, HAMP’s objective was to 
stimulate mortgage renegotiation, a more complex activity that servicers have limited experience with and one that 
requires significant servicing infrastructure. Consequently, relative to HAMP, competitive frictions could play a 
more important role in HARP implementation compared with servicer organizational capabilities. 
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we provide a novel assessment of the largest policy intervention in refinancing market during the 
recent crisis. Our findings also complement those of Scharfstein and Sunderam (2014) who show 
that, in general, refinancing markets with a higher degree of lender concentration experienced a 
substantially smaller pass-through of lower market interest rates to borrowers.3 
We also contribute to the vast literature on studying consumption responses to various fiscal 
stimulus programs. Some studies include Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003), Jappelli et al. 
(1998), Souleles (1999), Parker (1999), Browning and Collado (2001), Stephens (2008), 
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006), Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007), Aaronson et al. (2012), 
Mian and Sufi (2012), Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2013), Gelman et. al. (2014) 
and Agarwal and Qian (2014).4 Our analysis relies on a period with lower interest rates, where 
borrowers with insufficiently collateralized mortgages had large incentives to refinance, but were 
unable to do so (Hubbard and Mayer 2009). HARP generated an exogenous increase in supply of 
refinancing opportunities and we find significant increase in consumer spending among 
borrowers and regions exposed to the program. This finding is consistent with the 
contemporaneous work by Amromin, Di Maggio, and Kermani (2015) who also find that 
borrowers increase their spending after HARP refinancing and comprehensively explore the 
mechanisms driving the borrower response. Together, this evidence suggests that consumer 
spending response to mortgage refinancing can be an important part of transmission of monetary 
policy to the economy since lower rates generally induce more refinancing. 
Our paper is also related to the recent empirical literature that studies borrowers’ refinancing 
decisions (e.g., Koijen et al. 2009, Agarwal, Driscoll and Laibson 2013; Keys, Pope and Pope 
2014, Agarwal, Rosen and Yao 2014; Anderson et. al. 2014). This literature focuses on borrower 
specific factors like limited inattention and inertia in explaining their refinancing decisions. 
While such borrower specific factors can also help account the muted response to HARP (see 
Johnson et al. 2015 for recent evidence), our work emphasizes the importance of financial 
intermediaries and the degree of market competition in explaining part of this shortfall. 
Finally our work relates broadly to the recent growing literature on the housing and financial 
crisis (e.g., Mayer et al. 2009 and 2014; Keys et al. 2010, 2012; Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo 
2013, Favilukis, Ludvingson, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2013; Eberly and Krishnamurthy 2014, 
Hsu, Matsa and Melzer, 2014, Melzer 2014, Stroebel and Vavra 2014). We contribute to this 
literature by providing the first comprehensive assessment of the largest intervention aimed at 
stimulating mortgage refinancing during the Great Recession.  
																																																								
3 Within a broader context on market competitiveness and pricing power, this paper is related to the seminal work of 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) and to the earlier empirical research on pass through of changes in interest rates by 
lenders in different competitive environments (e.g., Neumark and Sharpe 1992). 
4 The literature finds mixed evidence: some studies find that the consumption response is essentially zero, while 
other find that liquidity constrained consumers respond positively to the fiscal stimulus programs. 
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II. Background and Empirical Strategy 
II.A U.S. mortgage markets before and during the Great Recession  
 
The U.S. mortgage markets are characterized by several unique features. First, a majority of 
mortgage contracts offer fixed interest rates and amortize over long time periods, commonly set 
at 15 or 30 years. Second, most mortgages can be repaid in full at any point in time without 
penalties, typically by taking out a new loan backed by the same property (refinancing). Finally, 
the majority of mortgages, the so-called conforming loans, are backed by government-sponsored 
enterprises or GSEs.5 The GSEs guarantee full payment of interest and principal to investors on 
behalf of lenders and in exchange charge lenders a mixture of periodic and upfront guarantee 
fees (called “g-fees”). In practice, both types of g-fees are typically rolled into the interest rate 
offered to the borrower and are collected as part of the monthly mortgage payment. The interest 
rates charged to borrowers are thus affected by three main components: the yield on the 
benchmark Treasury notes to capture prevailing credit conditions, the credit profile of the 
borrower that affects the g-fee charged for insurance of default risk (which depends on factors 
such as FICO credit score and LTV ratio), and finally, a lender’s markup. In addition the 
borrowers need to satisfy a set of criteria to be eligible for conforming financing based on factors 
such as loan amount and LTV ratio.6 
Under this institutional setup, a borrower with a FRM might be able to take advantage of 
declines in the general level of interest rates by refinancing a loan. The economic gain from 
refinancing is clearly affected by potential changes in borrower creditworthiness, as well as the 
mortgage market environment. During periods of favorable economic conditions, such as those 
between 2002 and 2006, refinancing market functioned smoothly. Borrower incomes and credit 
scores remained steady. Home prices increased, allowing equity extraction at refinancing while 
maintaining stable LTV ratios. Defaults were rare and supply of mortgage credit was plentiful. 
Each of these components changed dramatically during the Great Recession. Rapidly rising 
unemployment rates and the attendant stress to household ability to service debt obligations 
impaired income and credit scores. As home prices dropped precipitously, many borrowers were 
left with little or no equity in their homes, making them ineligible for conforming loan 
refinancing. By early 2010, close to a quarter of all mortgage borrowers found themselves 
																																																								
5 As of the end of 2013, GSE-backed securities (agency mortgage backed securities [MBS]) accounted for just over 
60% of outstanding mortgage debt in the U.S. About half of the agency MBS market is backed by Fannie Mae, 
slightly less than 30% is backed by Freddie Mac, and the rest is backed by Ginnie Mae, which securitizes mortgages 
made by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA). For the purposes of this 
paper, our discussion of GSEs will be limited to the practices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. FHA and VA 
mortgages also represent an important source of funding, particularly for low down-payment loans to borrowers 
with somewhat impaired credit history. However, they remain beyond the scope of this paper. 
6 Conforming mortgages cannot exceed the eligibility limit, which has been $417,000 since 2006 for a 1-unit, single-
family dwelling in a low-cost area. In addition, most such loans have LTV ratios at origination no greater than 80%. 
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“underwater”, i.e. owing more on their house than it was worth (CoreLogic data). Refinancing 
was also made more difficult by a virtual shutdown of the private securitization market, as 
investors fled mortgage-backed securities not explicitly backed by the federal government 
leading to a massive exit of lenders from the subprime mortgage industry.7 Since refinancing 
underwater or near-underwater loans would be considered extending unsecured credit and trigger 
prohibitive capital charges, balance sheet (portfolio) lending for such borrowers dried up as well.  
Overall, due to the environment in the credit industry, borrowers with insufficient home equity 
were shut out of refinancing markets, even as countercyclical monetary policy actions drove 
mortgage interest rates to very low levels.  
II.B The Home Affordable Refinancing Program (HARP) and asymmetric pricing power  
In the face of massive disruptions in mortgage markets, the Treasury Department and the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) developed a program to allow households with insufficient 
equity to refinance their mortgages. This policy action – the Home Affordable Refinancing 
Program, or HARP –instructed GSEs to provide credit guarantees on refinances of conforming 
mortgages, even in cases when the resulting loan-to-value ratios exceeded the usual eligibility 
threshold of 80 percent. Initially, only loans with an LTV of up to 105% could qualify. Later in 
2009, the program was expanded to include loans with an estimated LTV at the time of 
refinancing up to 125%. Finally in December 2011, the program rules were changed again by 
removing any limit on negative equity for mortgages so that even those borrowers owing more 
than 125% of their home value could refinance, creating what is referred to as “HARP 2.0”. 
After a number of extensions of its end date, HARP is scheduled to end on December 31, 2016. 
Given the size of GSE-backed mortgage holdings, opening up refinances for this segment of the 
market had the potential to influence household consumption. Although refinancing imposed 
losses on the existing investors in mortgage backed securities (MBS) who had to surrender high-
interest paying assets in a low-interest-rate environment, it benefitted borrowers who lowered 
their interest payments and received a substantial reduction in the NPV of their mortgage 
obligations (Eberly and Krishnamurthy 2014). Consequently, HARP aimed to provide economic 
stimulus to the extent that liquidity-constrained borrowers had higher marginal propensities to 
consume than MBS investors. It also potentially lowered the likelihood of delinquencies and 
subsequent foreclosures that may result in substantial deadweight losses (Mian et al. 2011). 
HARP got off to a slow start, refinancing only about 300,000 loans during the first full year of 
the program. Overall, more than 3 million borrowers refinanced during the first five years of the 
																																																								
7 Most prominent subprime lenders failed outright (e.g., Countrywide, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, IndyMac, 
and Lehman Brothers).  
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program, which amounts to up to between 40 to 60 percent of potentially eligible borrowers as of 
the program start date in March 2009.8   
Market commentary pointed to a number of flaws in the program design, which included 
frictions with junior liens and origination g-fee surcharges (LLPAs) that limited borrowers’ 
potential gains from refinancing. Crucially, lender willingness to participate in HARP was 
potentially undermined by ambiguities about the program’s treatment of representations and 
warranties (R&W).9 Any mortgage found to be in violation of its R&W can be returned (“put 
back”) to the originator, who would then bear all of the credit losses. The risk of put backs 
became particularly pronounced in the wake of the financial crisis when mortgage investors and 
GSEs began conducting aggressive audits for possible R&W violations on every defaulted loan. 
In the case of low-equity and underwater loans targeted by HARP the risk of default was 
considered to be particularly high. As a result, mortgage originators that securitized their loans 
through GSEs could have regarded R&W as a major liability.  
Policymakers recognized this issue and HARP lessened the underwriting requirements and the 
attendant R&W on loans refinanced through the program. However, this relief from put back risk 
on refinanced loans was granted asymmetrically, favoring lenders that were already servicing 
mortgages prior to their being refinanced through HARP.10 Such lenders faced few underwriting 
requirements and little exposure to this risk. In contrast, lenders that were refinancing mortgages 
that they did not already service had to face stringent R&W treatment.11  Finally, HARP rules 
were also asymmetric in servicer treatment since the program required less onerous underwriting 
if performed through a borrower’s existing servicer rather than through a different servicer.12 
II.C Post-HARP 2.0 developments 
 
In January 2013, FHFA addressed concerns about the open-ended nature of R&W violation 
reviews. This took on two forms: (1) FHFA clarified a sunset provision for R&W reviews, 
setting the time frame over which such reviews could be done at 1-year for HARP transactions; 
																																																								
8 The estimates on the number of potentially eligible borrowers vary. Based on Treasury and FHFA estimates up to 
8 million of borrowers could have been eligible for the program (with an estimated 4-5 million borrowers having the 
opportunity to refinance under HARP 1.0 with up to additional 2-3 million borrowers becoming eligible due to the 
removal of LTV eligibility limit under HARP 2.0). See FHFA, “HARP: A Mid Program Assessment” (2013). 
9 In every transaction, the mortgage originator certifies the truthfulness of information collected as part of the 
origination process, such as borrower income, assets, and house value. This certification is known as R&W. 
10 Mortgage originators that securitized loans through GSE typically retained servicing rights on those mortgages. In 
their role as a servicer, they collected payments, advanced them to the MBS trustee, and engaged in a variety of loss 
mitigating actions on delinquent loans. We use the terms “servicer” and “lender” interchangeably.  
11 This difference in treatment may result in higher expected origination costs for would-be competitors of existing 
lenders. Additionally, this market power to existing servicers may have been more consequential in the case of high 
LTV borrowers since such borrowers would be associated with greater default risk, and hence higher put back risk. 
12 For instance, under HARP the lender had to verify that eligible borrowers missed at most one payment on their 
existing loan during the previous 12 months. This information was already available with the incumbent lender. 
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(2) FHFA clarified which violations were subject to this sunset and which were severe enough 
(e.g. fraud) to be subject to life-of-the-loan timeframe. These changes went into effect in January 
2013. The clarification of the R&W process may have had a direct effect on the competitive 
advantage of same-servicer HARP refinances. Before the sunset provisions, a new servicer was 
taking on an indefinite (or at least ambiguous) R&W risk. However, with the provision in place, 
this risk was limited to a 1-year window for a pre-specified set of violations.  
III. Data and Empirical Setting:  
III.A Data  
The main data used in this study comes from a large proprietary database of conforming 
mortgages securitized by a large secondary market participant. The conforming loans are 
mortgages that satisfy the underwriting guidelines of GSEs (such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac). These mortgages are usually made to borrowers with relatively high credit scores, low 
initial LTV ratios, and fully documented incomes and assets. In addition, these mortgages must 
meet the conforming loan limit. Recall that only conforming mortgages were eligible for 
refinancing under HARP. Thus, our data, which covers more than 50% of conforming loans -- 
amounting to more than 20 million of outstanding residential mortgages as of the program 
implementation in March 2009 -- is well suited to study the program.  
This loan-level monthly panel data has detailed dynamic information on rich array of loan, 
property, and borrower characteristics (e.g., interest rates, location of the property and current 
borrower credit scores and LTV ratios) and monthly payment history (e.g., delinquent or not). 
Importantly, as this data contains unique Social Security Numbers (SSN) for each borrower, we 
can track the refinancing history of each borrower, the servicer responsible for prior and current 
mortgage of the borrower, and whether refinancing was done under HARP. This matched data 
allows us to obtain all the present and prior mortgage terms including all relevant information on 
fees applied during the refinancing process including GSE g-fees.  
This detailed panel data on the refinancing history of each borrower constitutes a considerable 
advantage over commercially available products, which do not provide information on the entire 
sequence of transactions at the borrower level. This rich data allows us to account for detailed 
borrower level characteristics as well as conduct within borrower analysis to assess how terms of 
loans obtained under HARP relate to the terms of their previous transactions.  
The data provider has merged the mortgage data with each borrower’s consumer credit bureau 
records by using unique borrower identifier. These merged data allow us to observe the current 
credit history of mortgage holders in each month. Of particular importance to us is the auto debt 
balance information, which allows us to construct empirical measures of new auto spending 
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patterns at the borrower level. Our data ends in mid-2013, a period after which there were 
relatively few HARP originations. 
In our analysis we also employ the loan-level mortgage data collected by BlackBox Logic that 
covers more than 90% of privately securitized mortgages that were not sold to GSEs. These data 
were merged with borrower-level credit report information collected by Equifax using a 
proprietary match algorithm giving us a similar set of variables as our main dataset. 13 We focus 
on a set of borrowers with loans in this data that are similar on observables to those in our main 
sample. However, as these loans were not sold to GSEs they were not eligible for the program. 
Consequently, this group of loans serves as a counterfactual for the loans that could be 
potentially refinanced under the program. 
Finally, in our regional analysis we collect individual loan-level information from four databases. 
The first source is the LPS database maintained by Black Knight Financial Services, which 
provides dynamic information on the vast majority of loans in the United States. We complement 
this dataset with the information from the BlackBox database, which yields almost complete 
coverage of mortgage loans in the United States, allowing us to compute zip-code-level 
characteristics for variables such as average borrower FICO credit scores, fraction of HARP 
eligible loans among all mortgages in a zip code, average mortgage interest rates, as well as zip 
code level foreclosure rates. The second dataset provided by the Office of the Comptroller of 
Currency allows us to measure the quarterly credit card spending of borrowers in a particular zip 
code. The third database comprises the auto sales data from R. L. Polk & Company (see Mian, 
Rao, and Sufi 2013), which allows us to directly measure the car purchases in a zip code. Finally, 
we also use zip code level house price indices from CoreLogic. 
III.B Empirical Setting  
Our empirical analysis consists of two main parts. In the first part we aim to quantify the impact 
of HARP on mortgage refinancing and assess household spending and other economic outcomes 
around the program implementation. In the second part, we investigate the role of intermediary 
competition on the reach and effectiveness of the program. 
We start our analysis by assessing the impact of the program on the mortgage refinancing rate. 
We focus on fixed-rate mortgages, the predominant mortgage type in the U.S., which, unlike 
adjustable-rate mortgages, cannot automatically benefit from lower market rates. To get an 
estimate of the counterfactual level in the absence of the program, we exploit variation in 
exposure of similar borrowers to the program. Specifically, high LTV loans sold to GSEs 
(“conforming” loans) serve as the treatment group, while loans with observationally similar 
																																																								
13 BlackBox is a private company that provides a comprehensive, dynamic dataset with information on privately 
securitized subprime, Alt-A, and prime loans originated after 1999. Equifax is a major credit reporting agency that 
provides monthly data on consumer credit standing. 
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characteristics but issued without government guarantees (“non-agency” loans) – ineligible for 
the program -- serve as a control group. Using a difference-in-differences specification we will 
assess the differential change in the refinancing rate of the treatment group relative to the control 
group around the program implementation date. The identification assumption behind this 
comparison is that, in the absence of the program, the refinancing rates in the control and 
treatment groups would follow similar patterns (up to a constant difference). 
Next we quantify the extent of savings received by borrowers refinancing under HARP and shed 
some light on consumer spending patterns around the refinancing activity under the program. For 
this purpose, we exploit the richness of our data -- in particular the ability to track borrowers 
across transactions matched to consumer credit bureau records using SSNs -- to construct 
empirical proxies capturing consumer durable spending patterns. This data allows us to assess 
the reduction in interest rates provided to borrowers who refinanced under HARP, as well as 
track changes in their consumption activity around refinancing dates. 
Finally, we conclude the first part of our analysis by assessing regional outcome variables such 
as non-durable consumer spending, foreclosures, and house prices in regions more exposed to 
the program. Here, we rely on zip code data, since we do not have more micro data for variables 
like consumer credit card spending or house prices. The main challenge when attempting to infer 
such a connection is that a national program such as HARP affects borrowers in all regions. We 
address this challenge by exploiting regional heterogeneity in the share of loans that are eligible 
for HARP. In particular, we obtain a measure of ex-ante exposure of a region to the program as 
the regional (zip code) share of conforming mortgages with the high LTV ratios. We account for 
general trends in outcomes during the program period by focusing on relative change in the 
evolution of outcomes between regions with differential ex-ante exposure. This approach is 
similar to one used in Mian and Sufi (2012) and Agarwal et al. (2012). 
In the second part of our analysis, we investigate the role of intermediary competition on the 
reach and effectiveness of HARP. The main obstacle in evaluating the potential role of limited 
competition is to get an estimate of the counterfactual level in the absence of such frictions. We 
circumvent this issue in three ways. 
First, we construct the difference in interest rates on HARP refinances and regular conforming 
refinances, both originated during the same period and made to borrowers of similar credit risk 
(“HARP-conforming refi spread”). The regular conforming refinances represent creditworthy 
borrowers with significant housing equity who could refinance outside of HARP. This group 
serves as a natural counterfactual since the market for such loans was quite competitive and 
remained fairly unobstructed throughout the period of study. In computing the spread, we also 
take advantage of our detailed data that allows us to precisely account for variation in interest 
rate spreads due to differences in loan credit risk by absorbing variation due to g-fees. In our 
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empirical tests we assess how the HARP-conforming refi spread varies with LTV of the loan and 
across lenders, while accounting for the rich array of borrower, property, and loan 
characteristics. Higher LTV loans should see higher spreads since they may be subject to more 
limited competition due to a stronger incumbent advantage. Similarly, loans made by larger 
lenders, who may operate as monopolists in several markets, might see larger spreads.  
While potentially suggestive, the first set of tests may not fully address the concerns that such 
differences may reflect other factors besides competitive frictions. To address such concerns, in 
our second set of tests, we exploit variation within HARP borrowers. In particular, we relate the 
terms of refinanced mortgages to the empirical measure of their bargaining power. As we discuss 
in detail in Section V.C, in the presence of competitive frictions, all else equal, borrowers with 
higher legacy rates -- i.e., rates on mortgages prior to HARP refinancing – should face larger 
markups on their refinanced loans.  
Finally, in our key test, we exploit the change in the program rules from January 2013 onwards 
that lowered the put back risk of new lenders for loans originated previously by other lenders. As 
discussed in Section II.C, this change effectively alleviated barriers to competition in the HARP 
refinancing market. To the extent these barriers were quantitatively important, we expect to see a 
meaningful reduction of the HARP-conforming refi spread after the program change and an 
increase in refinancing activity under the program. In particular, we exploit a difference-in-
differences setting, analyzing the differential change in HARP interest rate (intensive margin) 
and refinancing activity (extensive margin) relative to mortgage rates and refinancing activity of 
regular conforming loans around the program change date.    
IV. Program Effect 
IV.A Descriptive Statistics 
We start our analysis by presenting the characteristics of loans that were eligible to be refinanced 
under HARP and contrasting these with similar loans that were not eligible for the program. As 
we discussed in Section III.B, the latter group serves as a counterfactual for the loans that can be 
potentially refinanced under the program.  In particular, the treatment group consists of all GSE 
FRM loans that would have been HARP eligible (that is GSE loans with current LTV greater 
than 80%) and the control group consists of all FRM loans that are similar on all other 
dimensions (such as FICO, LTV, interest rates, and loan balances) except that these are non-GSE 
loans and therefore are ineligible for HARP.14 This results in a sample of about 92,000 loans 
equally split between treatment and control groups. We track the refinancing patterns of these 
loans from April 2008 to December 2012. 
																																																								
14 The matching is one-to-one done based on FICO, current LTV (as of March 2008), interest rates, and loan using a 
sample of more than 1 million of program eligible FRM loans and more than 200 thousand of non-GSE FRM loans. 
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Table 1 discusses the summary statistics of loans in the treatment and control groups over the 
period before the program (i.e., from April 2008 to February 2009). As can be seen loans in the 
two groups consist of borrowers with similar FICO scores (728 in the control group versus 727 
in the treatment group), LTV ratios (95.6 in the control group versus 95.5 in the treatment 
group)15 and interest rates (6.62 in the control group versus 6.60 in the treatment group), and 
similar outstanding loan balances ($186,525 in the control group and $183,614 in the treatment 
group). Notably, in unreported tests we also confirm that these differences remain similar 
throughout the pre-program period.  
IV.B Micro Analysis: Refinancing Activity 
Figure 1A presents the first set of results related to the program. Here we plot the quarterly 
HARP refinancing rate in the treatment group. As can be observed, not surprisingly, there is a 
gradual increase in the refinancing activity done under the program once the program starts in 
2009:Q1.16 The estimates presented in the figure suggest that the refinances done in the treatment 
group under the program – i.e., the fraction of treatment loans refinanced under HARP every 
quarter -- is about 1.6%. In terms of cumulative effect over the sample period being depicted in 
the figure (until December 2012), we get about 25% of the eligible loans being refinanced under 
the program. As per the US Treasury, up to 8 million loans were broadly eligible for HARP (see 
Section II.B). Hence, our estimates applied to the entire stock of potentially eligible mortgages   
imply that about 2 million loans were refinanced under the program by end of 2012 and about 3 
million loans by end of 2014. This compares well with the 2.16 million loans refinanced under 
HARP by 2012 and the 3.27 million loans reported by the US Treasury by December 2014. 
The above analysis focuses only on HARP refinancing activity done on the GSE loans that were 
eligible under the program. However, the overall effect of the program on refinancing activity 
among the eligible loans also needs to account for any changes in refinancing activity that are 
induced on refinances done outside the program. To do so we estimate the differential change in 
total refinancing activity – i.e., refinancing done under HARP or otherwise -- in the treatment 
loans relative to the control loans. In particular, we estimate a difference-in-difference estimation 
around the program start date, reporting the estimates on differential change in refinancing 
activity after conditioning on borrower and loan characteristics. As can be observed from Figure 
1B, the overall effects on refinancing activity are similar to the direct treatment effect implied by 
the program refinances. Moreover, we do not observe significant differential changes in the 
refinancing rate between the treatment and control groups prior to the program, which yields 
further support to the validity of our empirical design.  
																																																								
15 Our main data includes monthly information on the current LTV ratio of the GSE loan. For non-GSE loans we 
compute the current LTV in each month using information on the loan’s outstanding balance and the appraised 
property value (computed with use of the zip code level CoreLogic house price indices) 
16 It is worth noting that take up rate was initially on the slower side and picked up from December 2011 once “high 
LTV” loans (i.e., loans with LTV of greater than 125) were made eligible under the program. 
14 
	
In Table 2A, we present the overall estimates of the program effect also accounting for various 
controls. In particular, in Columns (1) to (4) we use whether or not a loan refinances in a given 
quarter as the dependent variable and estimate the change in this variable for treatment loans 
relative to the control sample, accounting for a rich set of loan, borrower, and regional 
characteristics. The key explanatory variable is the HARP Eligible × After Q1 2009 that captures 
the differential change in refinancing rate of HARP eligible loans relative to confirming 
refinances after the program start date (after Q1 2009). The estimation is performed on quarterly 
data. As is evident, on average, we find that the treatment loans see an increase in refinancing 
activity by about 1.4-1.7% every quarter, the estimates that are in line with the ones implied by 
the direct program effect.  
Taken together this evidence suggests that the program induced a significant increase in 
refinancing activity, although a sizeable proportion of eligible loans did not refinance under the 
program. Moreover, our findings suggest the program did not lead to a significant substitution of 
refinances performed outside of the program with ones done under HARP. This is not surprising 
once we note that both the treatment and control groups experienced very low refinancing rates 
prior to the program, due to virtual shutdown of the refinancing market for loans with high LTV 
ratios in the period before the program. 
The analysis so far has focused on the extensive margin (i.e., new refinancing activity). In Table 
2B we turn our attention to the intensive margin to assess the extent of savings received by 
borrowers refinancing under HARP. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for a sample of more 
than three hundred thousand loans that refinanced under the program where the dependent 
variable is the difference between the interest rate in a given quarter and initial interest rate. The 
variable, After HARP, takes the value of one in the quarters following the HARP refinancing date 
and is zero otherwise. The results suggest that borrowers refinancing under the program obtained 
a reduction of roughly 1.4 percentage points (140 basis points) in their mortgage rate. These 
results are robust to including MSA fixed effects as well as a variety of borrower and loan level 
controls. This is an economically significant reduction since the average pre-program mortgage 
rate among the eligible sample is 6.6%. As Columns (3)-(4) of Table 2A indicate this mortgage 
interest rate reduction implies about $884 in savings to the borrowers per quarter, translating into 
about $7,000 in cumulative savings over the two-year period following the HARP refinancing 
date. We obtain very similar results when performing this analysis for the subset of HARP loans 
belonging to matched sample described in Table 1.  
Overall, the results in Section IV.B suggest that the program led to a significant increase in 
refinancing activity among eligible loans and, conditional on refinancing under the program 
there were significant savings received by the borrowers. 
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IV.C Micro Analysis: Consumer Spending 
We now assess changes in consumer spending patterns around the refinancing activity under the 
program. In particular, we use individual consumer credit bureau records merged with the 
dynamic mortgage performance data using each borrower’s SSN. This data allows us to observe 
the current credit history of mortgage holders during the months preceding and following the 
HARP refinancing date.  Using this data, we can identify new auto financing transactions within 
each borrower (new purchases financed with auto debt or new car leases), since such transactions 
are usually accompanied by a significant discontinuous increase in a borrower’s outstanding auto 
debt. It also allows us to measure a net dollar increase in new auto consumption associated with 
such new auto financing transactions (e.g., a difference between a new and prior auto debt level 
when new auto financing happens). As the vast majority of auto purchases in the U.S. are 
financed with debt (up to 90% according to reports by CNW Marketing Research), we will use 
these variables as empirical proxies capturing consumer durable spending patterns.17  
We first investigate whether borrowers change their durable spending patterns after HARP 
refinancing. For that purpose we estimate a specification where the dependent variable takes the 
value of one if a new auto financing transaction takes place within a given borrower in a given 
quarter and is zero otherwise. In this specification we include a set of controls capturing 
borrower, loan, and regional characteristics. Again, the key control is the After HARP, which 
takes the value of one in the quarters following the HARP refinancing date. The results are 
presented in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2B. The sample includes more than three hundred 
thousand loans that refinanced under HARP for which we have reliable auto balance data. 
On average, there is an increase in the quarterly probability of new car purchases associated with 
new auto financing after the HARP refinancing by about 0.8% implying 6.4% absolute increase 
during the two years following the refinancing date. This amounts to an increase of about 10% 
relative to the mean level probability of new auto financing prior to the HARP refinancing. 
Columns (7) and (8) present the analogous regressions using the net dollar increase in auto debt 
associated with new auto financing transactions (the difference between new and prior auto debt 
in the quarter of new car purchase) as the dependent variable instead. The estimates suggest a net 
increase in the auto consumption on the order of $185-$198 per quarter after HARP refinancing 
amounting to about $1,600 over the period of two years following the refinancing date. 18 
Combining this effect with the estimated savings due to HARP refinancing from Columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 2B suggests that the borrowers allocate about 20-22% of the extra liquidity 
generated by rate reductions to new car consumption. These findings are consistent with 
contemporaneous work by Amromin, Di Maggio, and Kermani (2015) who find that borrowers 
																																																								
17 We identify new auto financing transactions if the borrower auto balance increases in a given month by at least 
$2,000. Our results are robust to perturbations around these thresholds (e.g., $3000 or $5000 thresholds). 
18 We obtain similar results if we restrict the analysis to subset of HARP loans in the matched sample of Table 1. 
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increase their spending after HARP refinancing date and explore channels driving the borrower 
response.  Notably, this elasticity is also qualitatively and quantitatively similar to that found in 
Keys et al. (2014) and Di Maggio et al. (2014) who study the effects of mortgage rate reductions 
due to rate resets among borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages.  
Next, we assess the dynamics associated with these spending patterns among refinancing 
borrowers. In particular, we use the same specification as above but include a set of quarterly 
time dummies that capture the three quarters preceding the HARP refinancing and the eight 
quarters following the HARP refinancing date (instead of the After HARP dummy). Appendix 
A.1 shows the estimated quarterly time effects from this specification along with 99% 
confidence intervals. As we observe, the borrowers do not display differential changes in the 
quarterly probability of new auto financing or net dollar increase in new auto financing prior to 
the HARP refinancing. After the HARP refinancing, however, we observe a significant increase 
in both the probability and net dollar amount of new auto financing. Notably, although the 
largest effect occurs during the second quarter after the refinancing date, we observe a persistent 
increase in the probability of buying a new car and the associated net dollar increase in financing 
even two years after the refinancing date.19     
Figure 2A shows the cumulative increase in the net dollar amount of new auto financing implied 
by the estimated quarterly time effects we discussed above. As can be observed, borrowers 
display a net increase in new car consumption after the HARP refinancing, with the cumulative 
effect of about $1,600 over the two-year period. This economic effect is in line with the average 
effect reported in Table 2B.  
Our estimates based on the analysis above suggest that borrowers who refinanced under the 
program significantly increased their spending on durables (new cars). An obvious concern with 
taking these effects as being induced by refinancing is that the decision to refinance under the 
program could be endogenously determined along with other consumer activity (such as 
spending on automobiles). Note that the effects we document are not only centered at the quarter 
of HARP refinancing but present across the board after the refinancing. This suggests that these 
findings may not just be reflecting endogenous timing by borrowers. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that the refinancing was initiated by borrowers anticipating a change in auto spending well into 
the future. We therefore conduct two more tests to shed more light on this issue.  
First, we isolate our analysis to subset of high LTV borrowers who refinanced their loans in the 
vicinity of the program announcement. In other words, the decision to refinance for the bulk of 
																																																								
19 It is useful to contrast these findings with Mian and Sufi (2012) who analyze the 2009 CARS program consisting 
of government payments to car dealers for every older less fuel efficient vehicle traded in by consumers for a fuel 
efficient one. They find that almost all of the additional purchases under the program were pulled forward from the 
very near future. Our contrasting results might reflect the fact that the nature of stimulus is different under HARP:  
refinancing generates persistent interest savings that can amount to tens of thousands dollars over time.     
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these borrowers was essentially determined by the supply of refinancing – made possible once 
the program was initiated. We find similar effects for such borrowers.  
In the second test, we assess changes in consumer spending among eligible loans relative to a 
control group of borrowers – i.e., loans in the non-GSE market with characteristics that are 
similar to loans eligible for HARP as described in Table 1. We find a significant relative increase 
in the probability of new auto financing (about 0.18% per quarter) and auto consumption (about 
$43 per quarter) among the eligible loans relative to the control group after the program 
implementation date (March 2009). 20 Moreover, these estimates are very consistent with the 
magnitudes of the estimates from Table 2A-B. In particular, the results in Table 2A imply that 
the program induced about one-fourth of eligible borrowers to refinance their loans by December 
2012. Hence, we would expect the estimated magnitude of the differential increase in auto 
consumption among eligible borrowers relative to the control group to be roughly one-fourth of 
the estimated values presented in Table 2B provided that these values reflect the true treatment 
effect of HARP refinancing on new auto consumption. This is precisely what we find. 
Next we explore heterogeneity in these findings. In particular, we assess if these effects vary 
depending on the creditworthiness and wealth of borrowers. We sort borrowers into two groups 
based on their housing wealth, as proxied by their current LTV ratios (Panel B) and based on 
their creditworthiness (Panel C), as proxied by their FICO scores. Figure 2B and 2C shows the 
estimated cumulative increase in net dollar amount of new auto financing in these groups. As is 
evident, there is a significant heterogeneity in this effect across borrowers. During the first years 
after HARP refinancing, borrowers with lower housing wealth (above median LTV ratios) 
experience about a 20% larger increase in new auto consumption relative to borrowers with 
below median LTV ratios. Less creditworthy borrowers (below median FICO scores) experience 
about a 50% larger increase in new auto financing after HARP refinancing relative to a 
corresponding increase for more creditworthy borrowers (above median FICO score). These 
differential patterns are highly statistically significant and we also verify that they were not 
driven by the differences in mortgage balances or differences in mortgage rate reductions across 
these groups. In fact, after scaling new auto financing data by initial mortgage payments or the 
dollar amount of reductions due to HARP refinancing, we obtain similar relative differences in 
the cumulative patterns among these groups.21 As we will show in Section V, while high LTV 
																																																								
20 Note that if borrowers would increase their consumption regardless of their access to HARP refinancing we would 
expect to find no relative increase in auto financing among eligible loans relative to the control group after the 
program implementation since such effects would be differentiated out.    
21 These findings are consistent with life-cycle household finance models (Zeldes 1989; Carroll and Kimball 1996; 
Carroll 1997) that predict a larger increase in consumption due to a positive income shock among borrowers with 
lower wealth levels. Similarly, we find that borrowers with below median credit score – those more likely to face 
credit constraints from the market -- increase their durable spending more after HARP refinancing relative to 
borrowers with above median credit scores. 
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and low FICO borrowers exhibit strongest responses to refinancing, they were also the group 
most adversely affected by competitive distortions embedded in HARP program design.      
We conclude this section by investigating whether borrowers experiencing a larger reduction in 
interest rate show a larger increase in durable (auto) consumer spending. In particular, we 
estimate a specification where the dependent variable is a change in new auto financing after 
HARP refinancing (relative to its level prior to refinancing). We include a set of controls 
capturing borrower, loan, and regional characteristics as well as a variable, Rate reduction, 
which measures the extent of mortgage rate reduction due to HARP (in percentage points). 
Appendix A.2 shows these estimates. We find that borrowers experiencing a larger interest rate 
reduction due to HARP refinancing display a larger increase in durable spending. In particular, a 
one percentage point increase in rate reduction due to HARP is associated with a 0.12 to 0.2 
percentage point increase in the quarterly probability of new auto financing and a net increase of 
about $37 to $55 in the quarterly new auto financing. We note that these estimates do not capture 
the base effect of refinancing under HARP (on average borrowers receive a reduction of around 
140 basis points). Rather, they just reflect the relation between the extent of rate reduction and 
new auto financing among those that refinanced their loans.22 
IV.D Regional Analysis: Refinancing Activity, Consumer Spending, Foreclosures and House Prices 
We end our analysis of program effects by using regional data to assess the regional outcome 
variables such as consumer spending, foreclosures, and house prices. We rely on zip code data, 
since we do not have more micro data for variables like consumer credit card spending on non-
durables or house prices.  
As we noted in Section III.B, our analysis exploits regional heterogeneity in the share of loans 
that are eligible for HARP. We obtain a measure of ex-ante exposure of a region to the program, 
Eligible Share, as the regional (zip code) share of conforming mortgages with LTV ratios greater 
than 80% prior to the program implementation date. As discussed earlier, these loans are broadly 
eligible for the program. We account for general trends in economic outcomes over the time 
period of the study by focusing on the relative change in the evolution of economic outcomes 
during the program period. Our identification assumption is that in the absence of the program, 
and controlling for a host of observable risk characteristics, the economic outcomes in regions 
(zip codes) with a larger share of eligible loans would have a similar evolution as those with a 
lower share, up to a constant difference. 
We start with more than 10,000 zip codes for which we can compute the share of program 
eligible loans. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these zip codes in the data. There is a 
																																																								
22 In unreported results, we address potential endogeneity of rate reduction by instrumenting for the extent of rate 
reduction with a level of market interest rate prevailing at the time of origination of legacy loan. This approach is 
similar to the one in Section V.C where we instrument legacy rate with the Treasury rate. The results are similar. 
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significant variation in the share of eligible loans across zip codes ranging from just few percent 
of all mortgages to more than 70% of loans being program eligible. We further confine our 
analysis to zip codes that have at least 250 mortgages and for which we have reliable data on 
outcome variables. This leaves us with a sample of about 3,400 zip codes.  
We first verify that, consistent with our loan level evidence, zip codes with a larger share of 
HARP eligible loans are indeed more likely to experience more HARP refinances and 
consequently a larger mortgage interest rate reduction due to the program. We find that a one 
percentage point absolute increase in the ex-ante share of eligible loans for HARP is associated 
with an increase of about 0.24 percentage points in the fraction of loans that refinance under the 
program (see Appendix A.3). Moreover, the “first stage” results in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 3A 
show that there is a strong association between the share of loans that are ex ante eligible for 
HARP and the average interest rate reduction due to the program in a zip code. The effects are 
economically meaningful since we find that a one percentage point absolute increase in the ex-
ante share of eligible loans for HARP is associated with a reduction of about 0.38 basis points in 
the average zip code mortgage interest rate.  
We next turn to the association between the average mortgage interest rate reduction due to 
HARP and household spending on non-durables and durables. As Table 3B shows, consistent 
with our borrower-level results from Section IV.B, zip codes with larger rate reductions due to 
HARP experienced a relative increase in durable and non-durable consumer spending. In 
particular, the estimates in Table 3B suggest that a relative reduction of about0.15% in mortgage 
interest rate payments due to HARP in a zip code is associated with a differential increase of 
about 0.13% in the credit card spending growth (Column 2) and an increase of about 0.2% in 
auto purchase growth (Column 4). Figure 4A and 4B plot the average growth in credit card 
spending and auto sales, respectively in more (above median Eligible Share) and less exposed 
(below median Eligible Share) zip codes to the program. Consistent with the results in Table 3B, 
these figures show that we observe a significant relative increase in spending growth in more 
exposed zip codes after the program implementation. Overall, these findings, similar to our 
micro evidence, suggest that following mortgage refinancing under the program, borrowers 
significantly increase their durable and non-durable consumption.23  
We next investigate foreclosures and house price patterns across zip codes. The results in Table 
3B indicate that regions more exposed to HARP experienced a relative improvement in the 
housing market. The estimates in Table 3B imply that a relative reduction of about 0.15% in 
average mortgage interest payments in a zip code is associated with a decline of about 0.01% in 
																																																								
23 In unreported results we also find that the regions more exposed to HARP experienced a relative reduction in 
consumer debt delinquency rate (a reduction of 10 basis points in the average zip code mortgage rate due to HARP 
being associated with a 0.4% reduction in the quarterly consumer debt delinquency rate). This finding suggests that 
borrowers use some of the extra liquidity generated by mortgage rate refinancing to service and repay their debts.	
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the foreclosure rate (Column 6) and an increase of 0.13% in the house price growth rate (Column 
8). Figure 4C reinforces these findings by showing that the areas more exposed to the program 
experienced relative improvement in house prices after the program implementation.    
Overall, these findings support the view that policies aimed at reducing mortgage rates can have 
a meaningful impact on consumer spending and house prices. This evidence is consistent with 
Agarwal et al. (2012), who find that mortgage modification programs, when used with sufficient 
intensity, may improve a range of economic outcomes. It is also consistent with Keys et al. 
(2014) and Di Maggio et al. (2014) who show that a sizable decline in mortgage payments on 
adjustable rate mortgages induces a significant increase in new financing of durable consumption 
and an overall improvement in household credit standing.		
Taken together, our evidence in this section suggests that borrowers and regions exposed to the 
program experienced a sizable increase in consumption. However, as we already established in 
Section IV.B, a significant proportion of eligible borrowers did not participate in the program. In 
the next section we explore whether competitive frictions in the refinancing market inhibited 
program participation and the pass-through of lower interest rates to households, thereby 
adversely affecting the program impact on consumer spending among eligible borrowers.  
V. Role of Competition in Inhibiting Program Effectiveness 
V.A Descriptive Statistics 
As noted in Section III.B, we start our analysis by constructing a simple measure that captures 
the difference in interest rates on mortgages refinanced though HARP and on conforming ones 
that are refinanced outside of the program. This measure allow us to quantify the extent of pass-
through of lower interest rates to borrowers on HARP refinances relative to conforming ones 
with higher rates being associated with a lower pass-through. Notably, in the absence of 
competitive pressure, lenders may have incentive to charge borrowers higher rates on HARP 
refinances because such mortgages can generally be sold for more in the secondary market.24     
We define the HARP-conforming refi spread as the difference between the interest rates on a 
given HARP loan and the interest rate on a randomly assigned conforming mortgage in the data 
– i.e., those with LTV of 80% -- originated during the same calendar month, in the same location 
(MSA), and for a borrower with a similar FICO credit score at the time of refinancing.25 As 
noted, the latter group represents conforming mortgage contracts of creditworthy borrowers 
																																																								
24 Note that as GSEs fully insure credit risk of conforming loans the consideration that higher rates may lead to more 
defaults and losses is relatively unimportant for the investors in the secondary market.   
25 The conforming loan has a borrower FICO credit score within 20 points of the corresponding HARP loan. To 
avoid concerns about interest rate term premiums, we restrict our attention to fixed-rate 30-year mortgages. Note 
that the vast majority of HARP refinances during our sample period consist of this mortgage type. 
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carrying significant housing equity that could be refinanced outside of HARP, and for whom the 
refinancing process remained fairly unobstructed throughout the crisis period.  
Importantly, in computing this spread we take advantage of the unique feature of the GSE loans, 
namely the fact that the credit risk of these loans to investors is fully insured by the GSEs. As we 
discussed in Section II, GSEs charge predetermined fees (g-fees) for insurance of credit risk and 
these fees are reflected in mortgage rates charged to the borrower. We use our precise data on 
actual g-fees charged on each loan and remove this fee from interest rates charged to borrowers 
on HARP and the benchmark conforming loans while computing the HARP-conforming refi 
spread. 26  Consequently, the HARP-conforming refi spread should not reflect the relative 
difference in credit risk between HARP and conforming mortgages, which includes differences 
in credit scores and LTV ratios. 
We focus on the time period 2009-2012, which broadly corresponds to the first three years of 
program implementation. We later extend this analysis through the first half of 2013, a period 
that featured changes in program rules as discussed in Section II.C. Notably, the vast majority of 
refinancing activities under HARP occurred until mid-2013 (more than 80%), and thus are 
covered by our analysis.    
The first column of Table 4A confirms the existence of a sizeable mortgage rate differential 
between HARP and conforming loan refinances. Over the course of 2009-2012, the HARP-
confirming refi spread (g-fee adjusted) averaged about 16 basis points suggesting that there 
might be support for market power driven pricing of HARP loans. This markup is substantial 
relative to mean interest rate savings on HARP refinances in our sample (about 140 basis points).  
Next, we assess if the spread is related to HARP specific features, by constructing an alternative 
benchmark interest rate spread between conforming refinances in which existing servicers may 
also have some market power and purchase mortgages in which there is likely no such 
advantage. With refinancing transactions, an existing relationship might confer some competitive 
advantage to the existing servicer, whether through lower (re-) origination costs or less costly 
solicitation. In our analysis we compare conforming refinancing transactions with conforming 
purchase ones, both of which have an LTV of 80 – since the market for conforming LTV 80 
mortgages – both refinancing and purchase – are very liquid and quite competitive.  
Columns (3) and (5) in Table 4A show the resulting conforming refi-purchase spread, computed 
as the difference between average interest rates on conforming refinances and purchase 
transactions originated in the same month. The data confirm that market competitiveness kept a 
tight lid on whatever advantages the existing servicer might have had in the conforming 
																																																								
26 As discussed in Section II, HARP pricing surcharges (LLPAs) took the form of upfront fees. However, these fees 
were typically converted into periodic interest rate charges. We use the actual conversion that was used to adjust the 
observed interest rates on HARP contracts. 
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refinancing market. In particular, during the period preceding HARP 2005-2009, the average 
conforming refi-purchase spread was virtually zero (-0.55 basis points in Column (5)). Notably, 
the spread remained below 3 basis points even during the crisis period (2009-2012) 
corresponding to the time of HARP implementation in our study (Column (3)). These results are 
consistent with the idea that the conforming refinancing market operated with a healthier level of 
lender competitiveness than the HARP market.  
Table 4A provides further evidence on the central feature of HARP discussed at length in 
Section II.B, namely, the preferential treatment of existing servicers.  Such asymmetry in 
treatment may lead to an unusually high share of new loans refinanced through the existing (or 
“same”) servicers under HARP. Consistent with this view, as shown in Column (1), among 
HARP transactions conducted during 2009-2012, 54% of loans were refinanced by the existing 
servicer. On the other hand, as shown in Column (3), during the same period only about 33% of 
regular conforming loans were refinanced with the same servicer. This number is even lower 
during the period preceding the crisis (2005-2009) when only about 1 in 5 conforming loans in 
our sample were refinanced with their existing lender (Column (5)).  
Our discussion in Section II.B focused on the likely relationship between loan LTV and the 
degree of pricing power afforded to the existing servicer under HARP. Table 4B breaks down the 
key summary statistics of HARP refinances by four LTV categories: LTV ranging from 80 to 90, 
90 to 105, 105 to 125 and greater than 125. We observe that the HARP-conforming refi spread 
increases substantially with LTV despite the fact that in computing this spread we removed 
adjustment by GSEs (g-fees) that accounts for differential mortgage credit risk due to higher 
LTV ratios. In particular, the spread for loans with LTV greater than 125 is nearly thrice (33.7 
basis points) that for loans with LTV between 80 and 90. However, even for the loans closest to 
the regular conforming LTV levels (those in the 80-90 LTV category), the average spread 
persists at a non-negligible level of 11 basis points. These differences exists despite that the fact 
that the borrower and loan characteristics in this subsample of 80-90 LTV loans (Column (1) in 
Table 4B) are quite similar to those for the subsample of 80 LTV conforming refinancing loans 
(Column (3) in Table 4A). Moreover, these differences exist even though we account for 
variation in interest rates due to differences in credit risk by removing g-fees in computing this 
spread. Overall, it is unlikely that the significant and positive HARP-conforming refi spread is 
driven by differences in credit risk between HARP and conforming loans. 
Table 4B also reveals that the fraction of loans refinanced by the same servicer also substantially 
increases with mortgage LTV ratios: about 51% of loans with LTV ranging from 80-90% were 
refinanced by the same servicer compared with 78% of loans with LTV higher than 125%. 
Overall, these patterns are consistent with the notion that, relative to conforming refinances, 
HARP provided more power to lenders. 
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V.B Cross-Sectional Variation in HARP-Conforming Refi Spread 
We build on the analysis in Table 4 by systematically evaluating the determinants of the HARP-
conforming refi spread by estimating the loan-level specifications of the following form: 
൫ݎ௜,௧ு஺ோ௉ െ ݎ௜,௧஼ைெி൯ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜. (1) 
In these specifications the dependent variable, ൫ݎ௜,௧ு஺ோ௉ െ ݎ௜,௧஼ைெி൯, is the HARP-conforming refi 
spread for the HARP loan refinanced at t by borrower i.27 Since we want to assess how this 
spread is related to the observable characteristics of loans such as LTV, we include a vector of 
controls ௜ܺ,௧  that consists of a set of borrower and loan level observable characteristics all 
measured at t, as well as any remaining differences in these characteristics between the HARP 
loan and a corresponding randomly assigned conforming loan.   
As a first step, we compare the mean values of the spread across the four LTV categories, 
treating loans with LTVs between 80 and 90 as the omitted group. The results, shown in Column 
(1) of Table 5 confirm our earlier finding of uniformly positive fee-adjusted HARP-conforming 
refi spreads that are monotonically increasing in LTV. As we observe in Column (2), after 
accounting for characteristics such as borrower FICO scores, MSA fixed effects, year-quarter 
fixed effects for timing of refinancing transactions, and servicer fixed effects, we still find that 
HARP-conforming refi spreads is monotonically increasing in LTV. In particular, HARP loans 
with the highest LTV (LTV > 125) carry rates that are about 15.7 basis points higher than HARP 
loans in the excluded category (80 < LTV ≤ 90), which amounts to more than a 140% increase in 
the rate spread relative to that group.  Since we remove the exact g-fee adjustment that GSEs 
charge for insuring credit risk, it is unlikely that sizeable positive spread among HARP loans 
with high LTV ratios reflects greater default risk of these mortgages. 
We next assess the robustness of the descriptive statistics related to refinancing by incumbent 
bank for loans financed under HARP relative to those in the conforming market in Columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 5. Consistent with our prior evidence, we find that HARP loans with higher 
LTV ratios are much more likely to be refinanced by the same servicer compared with 
conforming refinances that serve as an excluded category (33% of conforming loans are 
refinanced by the same servicer). In particular, the coefficient for LTV>125 in Column (4) of 
Table 5 shows that, even after accounting for a variety of observable characteristics, HARP loans 
with LTV ratios greater than 125 are more than twice as likely to be refinanced by the same 
servicer compared with conforming refinances (33%+39%=72% versus 33%).  
																																																								
27 Recall that this spread is computed as the difference between the interest rate (net of its g-fee) on the loan by 
borrower i that was refinanced under HARP at time t, ݎ௜,௧ு஺ோ௉, and ݎ௜,௧஼ைேி, which is the monthly interest rate (net of its 
g-fee) of a randomly assigned conforming mortgage with LTV of 80%, originated during the same calendar month, 
in the same location (MSA), and to a borrower with a similar FICO credit score at the time of refinancing as the 
HARP loan of borrower i. 
24 
	
The evidence above suggests that the mortgage refinancing market under HARP may not have 
been fully competitive. It is natural to ask if these effects are prevalent uniformly across lenders 
in our sample. To the extent that our controls capture the relevant borrower, loan, and regional 
characteristics one would expect no significant difference in the HARP spread across the lenders 
if the refinancing market is fully competitive. Figure 5A plots the HARP-conforming refi spread 
for different lenders in our sample. The coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) correspond 
to lender fixed effects from the specification that corresponds to column (2) of Table 5.  
As can be seen, controlling for other observables, there is a sizable and statistically significant 
variation in the HARP-conforming refi spread across the lenders, ranging from as low as -20 
basis points to about 20 basis points.  Moreover, as shown in Figure 5B we find a strong positive 
relation between the magnitude of the spread charged by a lender and the lender’s size (proxied 
by log assets) with the correlation between the two series being 56%. Overall, our evidence is 
consistent with the notion that lenders with high market power extract surplus from borrowers 
for their own benefit. 
V.C Variation in HARP-Conforming Refi Spread: Using Legacy Interest Rates 
While potentially suggestive, there is a natural concern that our evidence in Section V.B may 
reflect other omitted factors. To address this concern, in our second set of tests, we exploit 
variation within HARP borrowers. In particular, we develop and test the conjecture that the 
legacy interest rate on the mortgage prior to refinancing is also systematically related to the 
degree of pass-through under HARP. Specifically, we expect that, in the presence of competitive 
frictions, between two HARP loans that are identical on every dimension except for the legacy 
interest rate, the loan with the higher legacy rate would obtain a higher post-refinancing rate.  
To see this argument further, consider the simple example where two similar HARP eligible 
borrowers (A and B) want to refinance their loans. The interest rates on their original loans (i.e., 
the legacy interest rates) are RA,0 and RB,0, such that RA,0 > RB,0. Given the assumed similarity of 
borrower’s risk characteristics, the difference in interest rates faced by the borrowers could 
reflect time variation in benchmark risk-free rates pinned down by the timing of when these 
borrowers obtained their original loans. We further assume that a borrower needs to obtain a 
reduction of the interest rate of at least Δ per year in order to refinance a loan (see Agarwal, 
Driscoll, and Laibson (2013) for an optimal rule for Δ). An existing lender requires an interest 
rate of Reven to break even on the new mortgage, given the borrower’s risk characteristics. Since 
by assumption, borrowers A and B have identical risk profiles at the time of refinancing, they 
face the same breakeven rate. In a perfectly competitive market – proxied in our benchmark 
analysis by the conforming refinancing market -- the same Reven would apply to all lenders. 
However, suppose a new lender must charge a rate premium, δ, to compensate for higher 
underwriting costs due to higher put back risk (Section II). In this setting, what interest rates 
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could be obtained by A and B on their respective loans? The diagram below sketches out the 
case for borrower A. 
 
 
 
The shaded area represents the region of rates that satisfy the participation constraints of both the 
borrower and the lender. Although the existing lender can potentially charge RA,0 – Δ, the 
presence of the outside option offered by the new lender effectively constrains the maximum rate 
offered by the existing lender to be Reven + δ. This results in the existing lender being able to 
charge an interest rate above the expected cost and extracting some surplus from the borrower. 
In the case of borrower B, the existing loan has a lower interest rate, although it is still higher 
than the rate on the newly refinanced loan. In the diagram below, a new lender is unable to offer 
a rate Reven+δ as this rate does not satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint. However, 
because (RB,0 – Δ) < (Reven + δ), the existing lender can still realize a markup over its expected 
cost of funding the loan, albeit smaller than in the case of Borrower A. This difference in the 
interest rates obtained by A and B occurs despite the fact that these borrowers have the same risk 
characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
The discussion above assumes that the current lender (servicer) knows the borrower’s 
participation constraint as well as the costs of other lenders. In reality the incumbent lender may 
be imperfectly informed about both the borrower’s participation constraint as well as the 
refinancing cost structure of its competition (i.e., the incumbent lender may only know 
distributions of these factors). In such a scenario, the decision of the incumbent lender regarding 
the rate to be offered will reflect the trade-off between the expected profit in the case that the 
offer is accepted versus the risk of losing the borrower either due to violating the borrower 
participation constraint (offering insufficient reduction in rate) or due to other lenders being able 
to offer a lower rate (if their refinancing cost proves to be low enough). 28  
																																																								
28 It is not difficult to construct a simple market equilibrium model featuring such a tradeoff. In such equilibrium, 
consistent with the above discussion, the incumbent lender will still offer higher refinancing rates to borrowers with 
higher legacy rates and to borrowers for whom the expected cost of refinancing by other lenders is larger (and hence 
there is less competition). Moreover, fewer borrowers will end up refinancing their loans relative to the case when 
the incumbent servicer would offer its zero profit rates. These borrowers would be the ones with required reduction 
Interest rate 
RB,0 RB,0-Δ 
Reven+δ Reven 
Interest rate 
RA,0 RA,0-Δ Reven+δ Reven 
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To investigate the above conjecture of the positive relationship between the legacy interest rate 
and the interest rate on HARP refinances we estimate the following loan-level specifications: 
൫ݎ௜,௧ு஺ோ௉ െ ݎ௜,௧஼ைெி൯ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛ ൈ ݎ௜௉௥௘௩௜௢௨௦ ൅ ߝ௜. (2) 
As in specification (1) the dependent variable, ൫ݎ௜,௧ு஺ோ௉ െ ݎ௜,௧஼ைெி൯,  is the HARP-conforming refi 
spread of the loan by borrower i refinanced under HARP at time t and ௜ܺ,௧  is a vector of 
observable borrower and loan characteristics associated with the loan. Because we are interested 
in assessing the relation between this spread and the legacy interest rate, we include an additional 
control variable, ݎ௜௉௥௘௩௜௢௨௦, which reflects the interest rate on the loan before HARP refinancing 
by borrower i. The coefficient γ measures the association between the loan HARP-conforming 
refi spread and the legacy rate.   
Table 6A shows the relation between the HARP-conforming refi spread and the legacy interest 
rate. The panel preserves the setup of Table 5, while adding the mortgage rate prior to 
refinancing as a control variable. Column (1) shows that borrowers with higher legacy interest 
rates indeed face higher post-refinancing rates. This inference persists in Columns (2) through 
(4), with the magnitude of the estimated effect even strengthening once we control for a rich set 
of risk characteristics. Overall, we estimate a post-refinancing markup of about 9.6 basis points 
per 100 basis points in the higher legacy rate, holding the key borrower and loan characteristics 
fixed. This effect implies that the 100 basis points higher legacy rate is associated with a more 
than 50% increase in the markup relative to its mean level and about a 7% reduction in interest 
rate savings compared with average savings on HARP refinances.  It is also worth noting that 
borrowers with higher LTVs continue to suffer from higher HARP-conforming refi spreads even 
when conditioning on the legacy rate.  
It is possible that, despite accounting for variety of a borrower, loan, and regional characteristics, 
our results may still be driven by some unobservable factors correlated with higher legacy rates. 
To address this issue we rely on Section II.A where we discussed that mortgage pricing is tightly 
linked to the benchmark Treasury rates. In particular, we instrument the legacy interest rate on a 
mortgage with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield prevailing at the time of origination of the legacy 
mortgage to obtain variation in the borrower’s legacy rate that is exogenous to individual and 
regional characteristics. 
Table 6B verifies the relevance of this instrument through a regression of the legacy mortgage 
rate on the 10-year Treasury rate in the month of origination. As can be seen there is indeed a 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
in rates higher than the one offered by the incumbent lender but lower than what is implied by a break-even rate. In 
addition, some loans will also be refinanced by other non-incumbent lenders (i.e., mortgages they can refinance at 
relatively low refinancing costs).   
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strong association – a 1% increase in the 10-year Treasury rate is associated with a highly 
statistically significant 0.61% increase in the mortgage rate.  
Column (2) introduces other controls that contain categories for LTV range, FICO, FICO 
squared, MSA fixed effects, servicer fixed effects and, importantly, for the quarter-year fixed 
effects corresponding to the date of origination of the legacy loan. Consequently, in the 
specification in Column (2) of Table 6A we effectively exploit within-quarter variation in the 
relationship between Treasury rates and legacy mortgage rates. As we observe from Column (2) 
of Table 6B, in this much stringent setting, we still find that the 10-year Treasury is strongly 
related to the mortgage legacy rate (with a 1% increase in the 10-year Treasury rate being 
associated with a highly statistically significant 0.55% increase in the mortgage rate). Moreover, 
the high R2 values of 0.45 in the baseline model (Column 1) and 0.50 in the full model (Column 
2) indicates that mortgage rates indeed track the “risk free” rate quite closely.  
In the second stage of our analysis, we investigate the relationship between the HARP-
conforming refi spread and the predicted legacy mortgage rate from the first stage regression. 
Columns (3) and (4) present results where we instrument for the legacy rate using the 
specifications in Columns (1) and (2). Focusing on the full specification in Column (4), we see 
that the estimated coefficient on the instrumented rate (10.91) is similar in magnitude to the 
estimated coefficient on the observed rate (9.61) obtained through the OLS model of Table 5A. 
Overall, this analysis reinforces our earlier findings that unobserved borrower or regional level 
variation are not likely impacting the strong relationship between the HARP-conforming refi 
spread and the legacy rate. 
V.D Evidence from “difference in difference” around the program change 
In our final key test, we establish a direct connection between changes in the degree of 
competition in refinancing market and the program interest and take-out rates. We take 
advantage of the change in the program rules regarding the assumed legal risk of servicers with 
respect to loans they were refinancing. In particular, as discussed in Section II.C, from January 
2013 onward the program rules were changed significantly, limiting the legal risk of a lender 
who refinances a loan originated by another lender. Accordingly, we expect this policy change to 
result in a more competitive HARP market and thus possibly lead to a reduction in the HARP-
conforming refi spread and an increased program participation rate.  
To investigate this we estimate the loan-level specifications of the following form: 
൫ݎ௜,௧ு஺ோ௉ െ ݎ௜,௧஼ைெி൯ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߜ ൈ ሺ2013 ܪܣܴܲ ܴ݂݁݅ሻ௜ ൅ ߝ௜. (3) 
We follow the same structure as specification (2) with a few key changes. First, we focus on a 
new and extended time period, mid 2012 through the end of our sample period (mid-2013). 
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Second, we add a dummy variable, 2013 HARP Refi, which equals one for loans refinanced 
under the HARP program in the first half of 2013 and zero for those refinanced in 2012. As 
before, the vector of the control variables X captures the borrower and loan characteristics 
measured at the time of HARP refinancing as well as the legacy interest rate on the loan. The key 
coefficient of interest, ߜ, measures the change in the HARP-conforming refi spread  around the 
program change in January 2013. 
Before doing the formal analysis we explore how the two groups of loans in the difference-in-
difference analysis compare on various observables before the program change. First, we explore 
the pre-program change evolution of FICO and LTV of borrowers in HARP refinances relative 
to conforming refinances (see Appendix A.4). We find that the difference in LTV ratios across 
borrowers in the two groups remains constant in the pre-program period. In particular, the 
average LTV ratio for HARP refinances consistently remains about 30% above that for 
conforming refinances, with little relative change over time (recall that, by construction, 
conforming refinances have LTV ratios equal to 80%). Likewise, we do not observe any 
differential change in the borrower credit scores between the two groups in the pre-program 
change period. Thus, the two groups of loans seem well situated for us to conduct our analysis.  
Table 7 presents the results of our formal analysis.29 As can be observed across Column (1) and 
(2), ߜ is negative and significant, implying that there is a substantial reduction in the HARP-
conforming refi spread after the program change.  A borrower who refinances under HARP 
during the first half of 2013 enjoys, on average, a discount of around a 9.03 basis points relative 
to an otherwise similar borrower who secured a HARP refinance during the second half of 2012. 
Moreover, the estimated size of this effect is stable, ranging from -8.11 to -9.03 basis points, 
across specifications that account for a plethora of borrower, loan, and regional level as well as 
servicer fixed effects.  
To confirm that the change in the spread occurs precisely around the program change, we 
explore the timing of the effects documented in Table 7. In particular, we replace the 2013 HARP 
Refi dummy in specification (3) with monthly dummies corresponding to the month in which a 
given loan was refinanced under HARP (the excluded category is loans made in June 2012). This 
specification allows us to investigate the monthly changes in the HARP-conforming refi spread 
around the program change in January 2013. We present the results in Figure 6A. Two facts are 
worth discussing. First, the HARP-conforming refi spread remains at a stable level in 2012. Note 
that what we have plotted are demeaned spreads. The average spread during this period is about 
27 basis points. Second, and more important, there is a sharp reduction in the spread by about 10 
																																																								
29 Note that the specification above already removes g-fees that accounts for borrower credit risk. Moreover, since 
our dependent variable is measured relative to conforming refinances, any movements in the refinancing market that 
also affect conforming refinances are differenced out in our specifications. 
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basis points precisely in January 2013 (more than 30% reduction in HARP-conforming refi 
spread). This difference persists until the end of our sample period.  
Finally, we investigate the impact of the program change on the refinancing rate of eligible 
borrowers. For that purpose, in Column (3) and (4) of Table 7, we estimate a similar 
specification to (3) but where now the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the loan 
refinances in a given month and is zero otherwise. The excluded category is loans that are 
eligible for conforming refinances (loans with current LTV as of June 2012 less than 80). The 
key coefficient of interest is the 2013 × HARP, which captures the change in the refinancing rate 
of HARP eligible loans relative to conforming loans. Column (4) of Table 7 shows that, after the 
program rule change, we observe a 0.12 percentage point increase in the refinancing rate among 
eligible loans (about a 6% relative increase). Figure 6B verifies that the timing of this effect 
coincides with the change in the program rules. We also verify that almost all of this increase can 
be accounted for by an increase in the HARP refinances among eligible loans following the 
change in the program rules.   
Overall, the evidence in this section strongly supports the view that the an increase in 
competition between servicers resulted in a meaningful decline in interest rates on HARP 
refinances (intensive margin) and significant increase in the HARP refinancing rate (extensive 
margin). We next assess the market wide effects of the competitive frictions.  
V.E Assessing Market Wide Effects of the Competitive Frictions 
Our evidence presented in Sections V.A-V.D suggests that the limited competition had 
meaningfully reduced the pass-through of lower interest rates to consumers. The estimates we 
obtain are substantial. We find that, on the intensive margin, borrowers would receive a 10 to 20 
percentage points higher reduction in mortgage payments if HARP refinances were priced as 
competitively as conforming refinances (after accounting for g-fees). Moreover, on the extensive 
margin -- after applying the estimates from Section V.D to the stock of all eligible loans as of the 
program start date -- the refinancing rate among eligible borrowers would be 9.6 percentage 
points larger by December 2012 if the HARP-conforming spread was zero. In addition, this 
effect on take up rates due to elimination of the HARP interest rate markup is about twice as 
large (19.8 percentage points) among eligible borrowers with high LTV ratios (LTV>125).30  
																																																								
30 In computing these effects we note that the estimates in Table 7 imply that a decline of about 1 basis point in the 
HARP-conforming refi spread is associated with a 0.013% increase in the monthly refinancing rate among eligible 
borrowers. Assuming that this estimate is applicable over the initial 45 months of the program (until December 
2012) and taking into account that average HARP-confirming refi was about 16 basis points, implies that reducing 
this spread to zero would increase the refinancing rate by about 9.6%. As the spread for loans with LTV>125 is 
about 33 basis points (Table 4B) performing the same computation for this subset implies that reducing the spread to 
zero for these loans would increase the refinancing rate by about 20%. 
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Notably, this stronger extensive margin effect of markups could be particularly detrimental for 
consumption response obtained from the program. The reason is that, as we showed in Section 
IV.C, these highly indebted borrowers display (conditional on refinancing), a larger increase in 
spending from savings they receive from refinancing. Thus, the competitive frictions operating 
through both extensive and intensive margin, may have meaningfully reduced the program 
impact on consumer spending among eligible borrowers (especially in its first few years).  
To shed further light on the plausibility of these estimates we perform two further tests.  First, we 
focus on a representative sample of GSE loans (more than a million) that were eligible for the 
program as of its implementation date in March 2009. Within this sample we perform a simple 
quantitative assessment of the impact of the estimated HARP markups. For that purpose, we 
assume that borrowers need to obtain an interest rate reduction of at least 100 basis points to 
refinance their loans. This simple assumption is motivated by various factors, such as borrowers’ 
costs in refinancing their loans and the option value of waiting for further declines in interest 
rates (see Agarwal et al. 2013). Performing this simple exercise we find that the refinancing rate 
among eligible borrowers would be between 10% (for lower LTV loans) and 20% (for high LTV 
loans) higher in the absence of HARP markups (see Appendix A.5). Notably the magnitude of 
these effects is similar to the one implied by extensive margin estimates from Section V.D. 
Second, we explore whether the program was less effective in regions with a larger concentration 
of servicers with higher HARP-conforming refi spreads – i.e., those that charge borrowers higher 
rates on loans refinanced under the program. Recall that our analysis in Section V.B indicates a 
significant servicer level variation in the HARP-conforming refi spread that is not accounted for 
by borrower, loan, and regional level characteristics. To conduct this analysis we classify the top 
quartile of servicers with the highest estimated fixed effects displayed in Figure 5A. These high 
cost servicers account for more than 60% of loans in our data. Consequently, we compute the zip 
code level Eligible and High Cost Servicer Share as a fraction of loans in a zip code that both are 
program eligible and are serviced by high cost lenders.   
We find that the areas where a larger share of eligible loans is handled by high cost servicers do 
experience significantly lower rate reduction due to HARP. In particular, we note that our 
estimates (see Appendix A.3) suggest that on average the pass-through of lower interest rates to 
consumer through program refinances would be about 35% lower in a zip code where all eligible 
loans are serviced by high cost servicers compared with a zip code where all eligible loans are 
serviced by low cost servicers – after controlling for the share of HARP eligible borrowers in a 
zip code. Notably, both the intensive and extensive margin play an important role in explaining 
this effect, since we also find that fewer HARP eligible borrowers (about 17% less) would 
refinance their loans in the areas where all eligible loans were handled by high cost servicers. 
VI. Conclusion  
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Our findings suggest that significant number of eligible borrowers did not take advantage of the 
program. While certainly the borrower specific factors or other institutional frictions (e.g., like 
servicer capacity constraints) may help account for this muted response, our paper finds that 
limits to competition in refinancing market can also help explain part of this shortfall. Moreover, 
by adversely altering refinancing activity – the take up rate as well as the pass through -- 
competitive frictions may have significantly reduced the program effect on consumption of 
eligible households, especially indebted households who generally have a higher propensity to 
spend from additional liquidity (see Mian, Rao and Sufi 2013).31 Thus, our evidence suggests 
that provisions limiting the competitive advantage of incumbent banks with respect to their 
existing borrowers should be an active consideration when designing stabilization polices such as 
HARP. This insight would also apply to other polices whose implementation depends on the 
intermediaries that may have some incumbency advantage with respect to targeted agents. 
Our results also speak to HARP’s impact on redistribution and the overall consumption response 
in the economy. As Beraja, Fuster, Hurst and Vavra (2015) note, prior to HARP, refinancing was 
only available to more creditworthy borrowers with lower LTV ratios, which could exacerbate 
regional economic heterogeneity. Although we cannot quantify the overall GE effects of the 
program that might include the impact of the program on profits of mortgage investors and their 
consumption, our results suggest that less creditworthy and more indebted borrowers 
significantly increased their spending following refinancing. To the extent that such borrowers 
have the largest marginal propensity to consume, allowing them to refinance under the program 
could increase overall consumption and alleviate the regional dispersion in economic outcomes 
(see Auclert 2015 for redistributional effects of lower rates for aggregate consumption).  
Our findings also have implications for the debate regarding optimal mortgage contract design 
(see Eberly and Krishnamurthy 2014), highlighting potential benefits of adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs). In particular, by automatically reducing mortgage rates when market rates 
are low, ARMs can help alleviate frictions due to the limited competition in the loan refinancing 
market. Moreover, as ARMs can allow quick refinancing of borrowers regardless of the extent of 
their housing equity or creditworthiness, such contracts may reduce the need for large-scale 
refinancing programs like HARP, which, as we show, can face implementation hurdles. There 
are also additional benefits of ARMs that might be useful to discuss in our context.32 Of course, 
																																																								
31 Because these indebted households face higher default risk and have larger propensity to spend from additional 
liquidity (see Keys et al 2014), they are the key target of stabilization polices such as HARP. 
32 By automatically reducing mortgage rates, ARMs may help alleviate the barriers to loan renegotiation due to 
securitization (Piskorski et al. 2010; Agarwal et al. 2011) and lender concerns regarding borrowers’ strategic 
behavior (Mayer et al. 2014). In addition, as ARM contracts do not require the active participation of borrowers in 
the process of rate reduction, they can help alleviate the adverse effects of borrower inertia and inattention on 
mortgage refinancing (see Keys, Pope, and Pope 2014 and Andersen et al. 2014 for the recent evidence on these 
factors). See also Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) who highlight the benefits of ARMs for less creditworthy borrowers 
in an optimal dynamic contracting framework with costly default. 
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such benefits need to be carefully weighed against the potential adverse costs of ARMs. We 
leave this issue for further research.  
Finally, we note that our analysis using conforming market pricing as a benchmark does not 
imply that the conforming refinancing market was fully competitive. In fact, recent evidence by 
Scharfstein and Sunderam (2014) suggests that there are also significant frictions limiting 
competition in the regular conforming refinancing market. Their findings suggest that our 
estimates are, if anything, a lower bound on the overall effects of importance of competition for 
program implementation.  
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Table 1: 
Summary Statistics for HARP and Non-HARP Eligible Loans 
This table presents summary statistics of key variables in the pre-HARP period (2008: Q2 to 2009: Q1) in the treatment and control groups. The treatment group 
consists of GSE 30-year fixed-rate mortgages that have current LTV ratios greater than 80 as of March 2008 (one year prior to the program). The control group 
consists of a sample of full documentation prime non-GSE 30-year fixed-rate mortgages (privately securitized) that have current LTV ratios greater than 80 as of 
March 2008. Since, these loans were not sold to GSEs they are not eligible for HARP. These loans were further matched based on FICO credit scores of 
borrowers, current LTV ratios, interest rates, and loan amounts.  Data Source: Large secondary-market participant and BlackBox Logic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatment 
(HARP Eligible) 
Control 
(Non-HARP Eligible) 
  
Mean 
(1) 
S.D 
(2) 
Mean 
(3) 
S.D 
(4) 
LTV 95.5 5.2 95.6 5.8 
FICO 727.7 46.4 728.4 43.7 
Interest Rate 6.60 0.64 6.62 0.66 
Balance 183,614 91,718 186,525 110,104 
Number of Loans 46,154 46,154 
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Table 2:  
Borrower-Level Evidence: HARP, Refinancing Rate, Mortgage Payments, and Durable Spending (New Auto Financing) 
Panel A of this table presents OLS estimates from regressions that track whether or not a loan refinances around the program implementation (Q2 2008 till Q4 
2012). The dependent variable takes the value of one in the quarter a given loan refinances and is zero otherwise (the refinanced loans exit the estimation 
sample). The variable, HARP Eligible, takes the value of one if a loan belongs to the treatment group as defined in Table 1 and is zero otherwise. The variable, 
After Q1 2009, takes the value of one for the quarters after Q1 2009 and is zero otherwise. Column (1) presents the basic specification with no other controls but 
a constant term, HARP Eligible dummy, After Q1 2009 dummy, and the interaction term of these two variables (HARP Eligible) × After Q1 2009). Column (2) 
adds borrower controls that include variables such as FICO credit score, LTV, interest rates. Column (3) adds the fixed effects for the location (MSA) of the 
property (MSA FEs). Column (4) clusters standard errors at the MSA level. The estimation sample consists of a matched set of treatment and control loans (as 
defined in Table 1). The estimates in Column (1)-(4) of Panel A are in percentage terms and the estimation is performed on quarterly data. Panel B presents OLS 
estimates from regression where the dependent variable is the current interest (Column 1 and 2), the quarterly mortgage interest rate payments (Column 3 and 4), 
the variable that takes value of one if the new auto financing takes place in a given quarter and is zero otherwise (Column 5 and 6), and the net amount of new 
auto financing in dollars (Colum 7 and 8) (the difference between the new and prior auto debt in the quarter in which new financing takes place). The variable, 
After HARP, takes value of one in the quarters after HARP refinancing rate and is zero otherwise.  The sample includes all the loans that refinanced under HARP 
for which we have reliable auto balance data. In Column (2), (4), (6), (8) of Panel B the standard errors are clustered at MSA level and the estimates in Columns 
(1)-(2) and (5)-(6) are expressed in percentage terms. The Year-Quarter FEs correspond to the quarter-year fixed effects for the date of HARP refinancing. 
Standard errors are included in the parentheses. 
Panel A: HARP and the refinancing rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Mortgage payments and durable spending (new auto financing) after HARP refinancing 
 Mortgage rate  Mortgage payments Probability of  new auto financing 
Net amount of new  
auto financing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
After HARP -1.40 
(0.00) 
-1.42 
(0.07) 
-884.11 
(0.24) 
-884.67 
(37.93) 
0.78 
(0.03) 
0.84 
(0.04) 
185.08 
(5.63) 
198.88 
(9.38) 
         
Borrower Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
MSA FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,125,726 4,125,726 4,125,726 4,125,726 4,125,726 4,125,726 4,125,726 4,125,726 
Adjusted R-Square 0.617 0.868 0.515 0.667 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(HARP Eligible) × After Q1 2009 1.73 
(0.05) 
1.35 
(0.07) 
1.37 
(0.07) 
1.37 
(0.11) 
     
Borrower Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FEs No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,372,731 1,372,731 1,372,731 1,372,731 
Adjusted R-Square 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.01 
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Table 3: 
Regional Evidence: Consumer Spending, Foreclosures, and House Prices and Zip Code Exposure to HARP 
This table examines the relation between regional (zip code level) consumer spending, foreclosures, and house prices and the average mortgage rate reduction in 
a zip code due to HARP (in basis points) instrumented with the pre-program share of loans in a zip code that are eligible for HARP. The pre-program program 
eligible share, Eligible Share, is the fraction of outstanding first-lien mortgage loans in a zip code that are conforming and have current LTV ratios greater than 
80 prior to the program implementation. Column (1) presents the first stage specification without controls, in which the average mortgage interest rate reduction 
due to HARP, Rate Reduction due to HARP, is instrumented with the share of program eligible loans. Column (2) repeats the first stage, but includes a series of 
controls including the zip code average FICO credit score, LTV ratio, interest rate on mortgages along with the average zip code house price growth over the 
prior five years and state fixed effects. Panel B shows the corresponding second stage estimates results for the change in the quarterly credit card spending 
growth rate (Column 1 and 2), the auto purchase growth rate (Column 3 and 4), the foreclosure rate (Column 5 and 6), and the house price growth rate (Column 7 
and 8), all computed as the average of the respective value during the program less its pre-program level. The analysis is based on a sample of 3,443 zip codes. 
The estimation period is 2008:Q1 through 2013:Q2. Standard errors are included in parentheses.  
Panel A: Average mortgage interest rate reduction due to HARP in a zip code (First Stage) 
 (1) (2) 
Eligible Share 31.4 (0.007) 
38.0 
(0.010) 
   
Zip Code Controls No Yes 
State FEs No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.71 
 
Panel B: Instrumented “Interest rate reduction due to HARP” and consumer spending (credit card and auto), foreclosures, and house prices (Second Stage) 
 Credit card spending Auto purchase growth Foreclosure rate House price growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rate Reduction due to HARP 0.119 (0.028) 
0.129 
(0.036) 
0.394 
(0.019) 
0.201 
(0.021) 
-0.010 
(0.002) 
-0.025 
(0.002) 
0.353 
(0.015) 
0.134 
(0.008) 
Zip Code Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
State FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.42 0.01 0.64 0.07 0.83 
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Table 4:  
Summary Statistics for HARP and Conforming Refinances 
This table presents the summary statistics for mortgage loans that were refinanced under the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) during 2009-2012 
period (Column 1 and 2) alongside with conforming refinances originated during 2009-2012 period (Column 3 and 4) and 2005-2009 period (Column 5 and 6). 
The sample consists of more than 800,000 of HARP and conforming refinances. The variable HARP-conforming refi spread (in basis points) is computed as the 
difference between the interest rate on a given HARP refinanced loan and the mean interest rate for conforming refinances with a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) equal 
to 80 percent originated in the same month. This spread is guarantee-fee adjusted by subtracting guarantee fees from the HARP and conforming refinance rates 
before computing the spread. The variable Conforming refi-purchase spread (in basis points) is computed as the difference between the interest rate on a given 
conforming refinanced loan and the mean interest rate for purchase loans with an 80 percent LTV ratio originated in the same month. The Same servicer refi 
dummy takes a value of one if the servicer is the same before and after a refinancing, otherwise it is zero. The table also present summary statistics for other key 
variables, including the LTV ratio (in percentage terms) at the time of refinancing, FICO credit score of the borrower at the time of refinancing, interest rate (in 
percentage terms) on a loan before refinancing (Previous rate), interest rate on a loan after refinancing (Rate after refinancing), and balance of a loan at the time 
of refinancing (in thousands of dollars). Panel A presents the statistics of the full sample, while Panel B presents the mean values for HARP refinances separated 
in the four LTV ranges (as of the time of refinancing).  
 
Panel A: HARP and conforming refinances (All Sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HARP refinances  
2009-2012 
Conforming refinances  
2009-2012 
Conforming refinances  
2005-2009 
  
Mean 
(1) 
S.D 
(2) 
Mean 
(3) 
S.D 
(4) 
Mean 
(5) 
S.D 
(6) 
LTV 99.74 22.38 80 0 80 0 
FICO 749.75 44.31 759.82 40.81 737.06 47.89 
Balance 242.20 96.49 264.2 127.1 234.5 92.1 
Previous rate 6.07 0.58 5.69 0.74 6.30 0.83 
Rate after refinancing 4.67 0.52 4.55 0.51 5.75 0.69 
HARP-conforming refi spread 16.07 37.54 - - - - 
 
Conforming refi-purchase spread  
 
- - 2.83 29.09 -0.55 32.11 
Same servicer refi 
 0.54 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 
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Table 4 [continued]:  
 
Panel B: HARP refinances by LTV ratio at the time of refinancing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 < LTV ≤ 90 90 < LTV ≤ 105 105 < LTV ≤ 125 LTV > 125 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FICO 752.91 749.73 745.38 741.49 
Balance 248.09 245.06 230.69 218.48 
     
HARP-conforming refi spread 11.33 13.46 27.06 33.77 
Same Servicer 0.51 0.50 0.62 0.78 
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Table 5:  
HARP-Conforming Refi Spread, Same Servicer Refinances and the LTV Ratio 
Column (1) and (2) of this table presents OLS regression results for a specification with the HARP-conforming refi spread (in basis points) as the dependent 
variable. The set of control variables includes the three dummy variables that indicate the HARP loan LTV range of (90, 105], (105, 125] and >125. The loans 
refinanced through HARP with the LTV range (80, 90] serve as the excluded category and have an average HARP-conforming refi spread of 11.33 basis points.  
In Columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the dummy variable, Same Servicer, which takes the value of one if the loan is refinanced by the lender 
servicing the legacy mortgage and is zero otherwise. The set of control variables includes the four dummy variables that indicate the HARP loan LTV range of 
(80,90], (90, 105], (105, 125] and >125. The conforming refinances with LTV equal to 80 serve as the excluded category (33% of these loans are refinanced by 
the same servicer). Column (2) and (4) add borrower controls including the current FICO score (and its square) of the borrower and the metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA) fixed effects corresponding to the location of the property, time fixed effects capturing the quarter/year time during which the loan was refinanced 
(Year-Quarter FEs), and the fixed effects corresponding to the identity of the lender refinancing the loan (Servicer FEs). Standard errors are included in the 
parentheses. 
 
 Dependent variable: HARP-conforming refi spread 
Dependent variable: 
Same servicer refinance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
80<LTV≤90 - - 0.19 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.05) 
90 < LTV ≤ 105 2.13 
(0.13) 
1.48 
(0.44) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.06) 
105 < LTV ≤ 125 15.73 
(0.18) 
10.98 
(2.54) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.08) 
LTV > 125 22.43 
(0.22) 
15.77 
(3.06) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.10) 
     
Borrower Controls No Yes No Yes 
MSA FEs No Yes No Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs No Yes No Yes 
Servicer FEs No Yes No Yes 
Observations 414,172 414,172 828,344 828,344 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.36 
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Table 6:  
HARP-Conforming Refi Spread and the Previous Interest Rate 
Panel A of this table presents OLS regression results for a specification with the guarantee fee adjusted HARP-conforming refi spread as the dependent variable and 
the interest rate of a loan prior to refinancing as a control variable. Column (1) presents the basic specification with no controls but the previous interest rate. Column 
(2) adds borrower controls including the current FICO score (and its square) of the borrower and the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects corresponding to 
the location of the property. Column (3) adds time fixed effects capturing the quarter/year time during which the loan was refinanced. Column (4) adds the fixed 
effects corresponding to the identity of the lender refinancing the loan and clusters standard errors at the servicer level. Panel B of this table presents the results of a 2-
stage least squares regression in which the mortgage rate of a loan prior to refinancing, Previous rate, is instrumented with the average 10-year Treasury rate 
corresponding to the month of origination of legacy mortgage. The first two columns show the first-stage results in which the previous mortgage rate is regressed on 
the 10-year Treasury rate. Column (1) corresponds to a basic specification without additional controls. Column (2) introduces Other controls, including the dummy 
variables for LTV ranges as in Tables 2 and 3, FICO, FICO squared, year-quarter fixed effects corresponding to the origination of legacy and HARP loan (Year-
Quarter FEs), MSA fixed effects, and the servicer fixed effects corresponding to the identity of the servicer handling the loan (Servicer FEs). Columns (3)-(4) present 
the analogues second-stage results, whereby the dependent variable is the guarantee fee adjusted HARP-conforming refi spread and the control variable is the previous 
mortgage rate instrumented with 10-year Treasury. In Panel B the standard errors are clustered at the quarter/year level corresponding to the origination time of the 
legacy loan. Standard errors are included in the parentheses. 
 
Panel A: HARP-conforming refi spread and the previous rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Previous rate 7.54 
(0.10) 
5.75 
(0.10) 
9.97 
(0.11) 
9.61 
(0.78) 
90 < LTV ≤ 105  1.69 
(0.13) 
-0.29 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(0.42) 
105 < LTV ≤ 125  15.02 
(0.19) 
7.21 
(0.20) 
6.73 
(1.71) 
LTV > 125  21.42 
(0.24) 
10.20 
(0.26) 
9.31 
(1.93) 
     
Borrower Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FEs No Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FEs No No Yes Yes 
Servicer FEs No No No Yes 
Observations 414,172 414,172 414,172 414,172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.11 
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Table 6 [continued]:  
Panel B: Harp-conforming refi spread and previous interest rate instrumented with 10-year Treasury rate 
 
(1) 
Dependent variable: 
Previous rate 
(On the original loan) 
(2) 
Dependent variable: 
Previous rate 
(On the original loan) 
(3) 
Dependent Variable: 
HARP-Conforming 
Refi Spread 
(4) 
Dependent Variable: 
HARP-Conforming  
Refi Spread 
10-year Treasury 0.61 
(0.05) 
0.55 
(0.04) 
- - 
     
Previous rate 
instrumented with 
10-year Treasury 
- - 4.30 (0.43) 
10.91 
(0.92) 
     
Other controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 414,172 414,172 414,172 414,172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.50 0.01 0.11 
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Table 7:  
Difference-in-Difference around the Change in the Program Rules 
Column (1) and (2) of this table presents the OLS regression results for the specification with the guarantee fee adjusted HARP-conforming refi spread as the 
dependent variable and a dummy variable, 2013× HARP, equal to one if a HARP loan was refinanced in the first half of 2013 and equal to zero if it was 
refinanced in the second half of 2012. The sample period consists of HARP loans originated from Q3 2012 till Q2 2013. Column (1) presents the estimation 
results for the basic specification model with no additional controls. Column (2) introduces Other controls, including the dummy variables for LTV ranges as in 
Tables 2 and 3, FICO, FICO squared, year-quarter fixed effects corresponding to the origination of legacy and HARP loan, MSA fixed effects, and the servicer 
fixed effects corresponding to the identity of the servicer handling the loan. Column (3) and (4) present the OLS regression results (in the percentage terms) for 
the specification with the dummy taking value of one if a loans refinances in given month and zero otherwise. Once the loan refinances it is dropped from the 
estimation sample. The control variables include 2013 dummy that takes value of 1 if the loan is refinance in the first half of 2013 and equal to zero otherwise, 
dummy variable HARP that takes value of 1 if a loan is HARP eligible (as of July 2012) and is zero otherwise, and the interaction of these two variables 2013× 
HARP. In Column (3) and (4) the sample consists of loans eligible for HARP and conforming refinancing, respectively, tracked from July 2012 till June 2013. 
The excluded category are mortgages that are eligible for confirming refinancing as of July 2012. Standard errors are included in the parentheses. 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
HARP-conforming  
refi spread 
Dependent variable: 
Whether a loan refinances  
in a given month 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2013 × HARP -8.11 (0.19) 
-9.03 
(3.25) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
2013 - - 0.10 (0.07) 
0.21 
(0.06) 
HARP - - -0.06 (0.04) 
0.22 
(0.05) 
     
Other controls No Yes No Yes 
Observations 164,144 146,144 1,181,839 1,181,839 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.01 
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Figure 1:  
HARP and Refinancing Rate 
Panel (a) of the figure shows the percentage of loans refinancing under HARP in the treatment group (eligible loans) in a given quarter. Panel (b) shows the 
estimated coefficients of interaction terms between quarterly time dummies and the treatment indicator (HARP Eligible) along with 99% confidence intervals for 
the specification where the dependent variable takes the value of one whether the loan refinances (through HARP or otherwise) in a given quarter and is zero 
otherwise. The refinanced loans exit the estimation sample. The specification is similar to one in Column (4) of Table 2A but where we replace the After Q1 2009 
dummy with a set of quarterly dummies (the excluded category includes observations from 2008:Q2). This specification allows us to investigate the quarter-by-
quarter changes in the refinancing rate between the treatment and control group (relative to the level in 2008:Q2). The estimation period is 2008:Q3 to 2012:Q4.  
(a) Quarterly HARP refinancing rate in the treatment group (b) Change in the refinancing rate between treatment and control group 
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Figure 2:  
Cumulative Change in the Durable Spending (New Auto Financing) after the HARP Refinancing Date  
Panel (a) shows the estimated cumulative change in the net amount of new auto financing (in dollars) along with 99% confidence intervals in the eight quarters 
following the HARP refinancing. These estimates are from a borrower level specification where the dependent variable takes the value of one if a new auto 
financing transaction takes place in a given quarter and is zero otherwise. We include a set of controls capturing borrower, loan, and regional characteristics and a 
set of quarterly time dummies that capture the three quarters preceding HARP refinancing and eight quarters following HARP refinancing date. Panel (b) plots 
the estimates for less indebted borrowers with below median LTV (dashed line) and more indebted borrowers with above median LTV (solid line). Panel (c) 
plots similar estimates for more creditworthy borrowers with above median FICO (dashed line) and less creditworthy borrowers with below median FICO (solid 
line). The average differences across these groups in Panels (b) and (c) are statistically significant at 1%. 
(a) Cumulative change in the net amount of new auto financing 
(b) Less and more indebted (below/above median LTV) (c) Less and more creditworthy (below/above FICO) 
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Figure 3: 
Geographical Distribution of Zip Codes and HARP Eligible Share 
 
This figure presents the geographic distribution of zip codes in our overall sample across the United States. In addition, the figure displays the fraction of loans in 
a zip code which are eligible for HARP (as of March 2009). As we observe, there is a significant variation in the HARP Eligible share across zip codes (ranging 
from just few percent of loans being eligible for the HARP program to more than 70%). 
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Figure 4:  
Regional Evidence: Credit Card Spending, Auto Purchase, and House Price Growth in High and Low HARP Exposed Areas 
This figure shows the average credit card spending, auto purchase, and house price growth rates in the high HARP exposed (above median Eligible Share) and 
low HARP exposed (below median Eligible Share) zip codes. The high HARP exposed group is displayed in solid line and low HARP exposed group is 
displayed in dashed line. Zip code credit card spending growth is computed using proprietary data from U.S. Treasury. The auto purchase growth data come from 
Mian and Sufi (2010) (based on R.L. Polk & Company data). The house price growth is computed using CoreLogic zip-code level price indices.  
(a) Credit card spending growth (b) Auto purchase growth  
(c) House price growth 
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Figure 5:  
HARP-Conforming Spread across Lenders 
Panel (a) of this figure plots the servicer fixed effects corresponding to the identity of HARP lender from the specification in Column (2) of Table 5, in which the 
dependent variable is the HARP-conforming refi spread along with 95% confidence intervals. Lender names have been anonymized. Panel (b) shows the relation 
between the lenders’ fixed effects (y-axis) and their log asset size as of 2009 (x-axis). This figure is plotted only for the lenders for which we have asset size data 
collected from publicly available sources.  
 
 
(a) Lenders’ fixed effects Lender’s fixed effects and log asset size  
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Figure 6:  
Change in the Program Rules and the HARP-Conforming Refi Spread and Harp-Conforming Refinancing Rate 
Panel (a) of this figure plots the estimated coefficients (based on OLS) for monthly fixed effects along with 99% confidence intervals around these estimates from a 
regression of HARP-conforming refi spread (in basis points) on a set of borrower and loan characteristics including current loan LTV ratios, borrower credit scores, 
servicer fixed effects, MSA fixed effects, previous rate, and monthly time fixed effects. The excluded category corresponds to HARP refinances that occurred during 
July 2012 so the plotted coefficients show the estimated change relative to the spread from this period. Panel (b) shows the corresponding results from the specification 
where now the dependent variable takes the value of one if the loan refinances in a given month and is zero otherwise. The plotted coefficients are the estimated 
interaction terms of time dummies with HARP eligible dummy. In panel (b) the base category are loans that are eligible for conforming refinances (loans with current 
LTV as of June 2012 less than 80). The displayed coefficients in panel (b) show the estimated change in the difference between refinancing rates of HARP and 
conforming loans (relative to the level in July 2012). The estimation period is from July 2012 till June 2013. As we observe the HARP spread and the difference 
between refinancing rates of HARP eligible and conforming loans generally persists at a stable level prior to the change in program rules in January 2013. Once the 
new rules are in place the spread declines sharply by about 10 basis points in 2013 and the HARP refinancing rate experiences a significant differential increase (by 
about 0.12% per quarter).  
	
  
 
(a) Change in the HARP-conforming spread (b) Change in the refinancing rate 
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Appendix A.1: 
Borrower-Level Evidence: Change in the Durable Spending (New Auto Financing) around the HARP Refinancing Date 
Panel (a) of this figure plots the OLS estimates for quarterly time fixed effects (along with 99% confidence intervals) from the specification where the dependent 
variable takes the value of one if a new auto financing transaction takes place in a given quarter and is zero otherwise. In this specification we include a set of 
controls capturing borrower, loan, and regional characteristics and a set of (plotted) quarterly time dummies that capture the three quarters preceding HARP 
refinancing and eight quarters following HARP refinancing date. Panel (b) shows the corresponding results for the specification with the net amount of new auto 
financing (in dollars) as the dependent variable.  
(a) Change in the probability of new auto financing (b) Change in the net amount of new auto financing 
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Appendix A.2:  
Borrower-Level Evidence: Change in the Durable Spending (New Auto Financing) and the Rate Reduction due to HARP 
This table presents OLS estimates from the specification where the dependent variable is the average quarterly probability of new auto financing in percentage 
points (Column 1 and 2) and net dollar amount of new auto financing in dollars (Column 3 and 4) after the HARP refinancing date less the corresponding value 
prior to the HARP refinancing. The control variable Rate Reduction captures the difference between the legacy interest rate and rate on refinanced HARP loan (in 
percentage terms). Columns (1) and (3) present the estimation results for the basic specification with no additional controls. Columns (2) and (4) add borrower 
controls that include variables such as FICO credit score, LTV, interest rates and the fixed effects for the location (MSA) of the property (MSA FEs). Column (2) 
and (4) clusters standard errors at the MSA level. The estimation sample consists of a set of borrowers refinancing their loans thru HARP during Q2 2009 till Q4 
2012 and tracked over the period of two years after their refinancing date. Standard errors are included in the parentheses. 
 
 
Probability of  
new auto financing 
Net amount of new  
auto financing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rate reduction 0.20 0.12 55.15 36.94 
  (0.03) (0.04) (11.25) (72.13) 
     
Borrower Controls No Yes No Yes 
MSA FEs No Yes No Yes 
Year Quarter FEs No Yes No Yes 
Servicer FEs No Yes No Yes 
Observations 357,507 357,507 357,507 357,507 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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Appendix A.3:  
Regional Evidence: Mortgage Rate Reduction, Program Refinancing Rate and the Fraction of Eligible Loans and Eligible 
Loans Serviced by High Cost Lenders in a Zip Code 
Column (1) and (2) of this table investigates the relation between the reduction in the average mortgage rate in a zip code due to HARP (in basis points) during 
first four years of the program and zip code level Eligible Share and Eligible and High Cost Servicer Share. Eligible Share is the fraction of loans in a zip code 
that are GSE and have current LTV ratios greater than 80 prior to the program implementation. Eligible and High Cost Servicer Share is the fraction of loans in a 
zip code that are GSE, have current LTV ratios greater than 80 and are serviced by high cost servicers prior to the program implementation. We also include a set 
of controls including the zip code average FICO credit score, LTV ratio, interest rate on mortgages along with the average zip code house price growth over the 
prior five years and state fixed effects. Column (1) presents the specification without Eligible and High Cost Servicer Share control, while Column (2) repeats 
this analysis, but includes this variable in the set of controls. Columns (3) and (4) provide the corresponding analysis for the fraction of loans in a zip code 
refinancing under HARP as the dependent variable. The servicer is classified as high cost if it is in the top quartile of servicers with the highest estimated fixed 
effects as displayed in Figure 5A. These high cost servicers account for over 60% of loans in our data. The analysis is based on a sample of 3,443 zip codes. 
Standard errors (based on the OLS estimates) are included in parentheses.  
 
 Dependent variable: 
Reduction in the average mortgage  
interest rate in a zip code due to HARP 
(in basis points) 
Dependent variable: 
Fraction of loans in a zip code  
refinancing under HARP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Eligible Share 38.0 (0.01) 
49.1 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.01) 
0.35 
(0.01) 
Eligible and High Cost Servicer Share - -17.4 (0.05) - 
-0.16 
(0.03) 
Zip Code Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.70 0.71 0.68 0.69 
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Appendix A.4:  
Evolution of Observables among HARP and Conforming Refinances prior to the Program Change 
This figure we track the evolution of average FICO credit score of borrowers (panel a) and LTV ratio (panel b) at the time of loan refinancing among HARP and 
conforming refinance during the six months preceding the change in the program rules. The solid line represents HARP refinances while the dashed line shows 
the corresponding means for conforming refinances. As we observe the average LTV ratio for HARP refinances consistently remain about 30% above that for 
conforming refinances, with little relative change over time (by construction our benchmark conforming refinances have LTV ratios equal to 80 percent). We 
also do not observe a substantial relative variation in the borrower credit scores between HARP and conforming refinances. 
 
 
(a) FICO credit score 
 
(b)  LTV 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
2012‐Jul 2012‐Aug 2012‐Sep 2012‐Oct 2012‐Nov 2012‐Dec
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2012‐Jul 2012‐Aug 2012‐Sep 2012‐Oct 2012‐Nov 2012‐Dec
56 
	
 
Appendix A.5: 
Simulation of the Program Effectiveness: Impact of Guarantee Fees and Servicer Markups on the Borrowers’ Savings 
(Intensive Margin) and the Refinancing Rate (Extensive Margin) 
In this appendix we perform a simple simulation to assess the impact of guarantee fees and servicer markups on the borrowers’ savings (intensive margin) and the 
refinancing rate (extensive margin) induced by HARP. The figure plots the simulated interest rate savings of the borrowers (panel a) due to the HARP refinancing (in 
percentage points) and the percentage of eligible borrowers refinancing their loans under the HARP (panel b) across the borrowers current LTV ratios as of March 
2009 (the date of the program implementation). Top solid line shows the case in which borrowers can refinance (at no additional cost) to the benchmark conforming 
rate (with no guarantee fees) as of March 2009. The middle dashed line shows the case in which borrowers face the HARP guarantee fees. The bottom dashed line 
corresponds to the case when borrowers face both the HARP guarantee fees and the predicted servicer “monopolistic” markups when they refinance their loans. To 
predict this markup we use the estimates from our specification in Column (4) of Table 5. In the calculation in panel (b) we assume that in order to refinance the 
borrowers need to obtain an annual interest rate reduction of at least 1% (100 basis points per year). Source: a random sample of all borrowers with 30 year FRMs that 
were eligible for HARP as of its implementation date in March 2009 based on their estimated LTV ratios of greater than 80 percent. This sample amounts to more than 
1.1 million conforming mortgages from a large secondary market participant, which is more than 15% of the entire population of eligible loans. 
(a) Interest rate savings on HARP refinances (in percentage points) (b) Percentage of eligible borrowers refinancing under HARP 
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